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REPRESENTING THE UNREPRESENTED IN
CLASS ACTIONS SEEKING MONETARY
RELIEF
BRIAN WOLFMAN*
ALAN B. MORRISON**

Class actions are important and usefu~ both to deter wrongful conduct and to provide compensation for injured plaintiffs. In complex cases, however, the existing
class action structure falters. In this Article, Messrs. lVolfnuzn and Morrison argue
that in "settlement class actions" the current class action rules do not adequately
protect class members whose interests do not coincide with dzose of the class represenlalives and the class attorneys. Through a survey ofrecent, prominent settlement
class actions, the authors show that the current system does not fairly treat subgroups in a class with respect to matters as diverse as future injury, fee distribution,
applicable law, and timing of payments. In response to these problems and others,
Messrs. Wolfnuzn and Morrison ultimately urge the adoption of amendments to dze
class action rules to handle settlement class actions. The effect ofthese amendments
would be twofold: first, to ensure that "unrepresented" class members would be
represented by counsel who would have adequate opportunity to dzampion their
interests; and second, to allow a judge handling a settlement class action to evaluate
the substantive provisions of a proposed settlement, and to impose or reject certain
terms in order to assure fairness within the class, as wea as becween the class and
defendants.

* Attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1978, University
of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1984, Harvard University.
** Attorney, cofounder, and fonner director, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1959, Yale University; LL.B., 1966, Harvard University.
Both authors have represented absent class members and amici in objecting to class
action settlements, including many of those discussed in this Article-the CCR-asbestos
settlement, the breast-implant case, the heart-valve case, and several of the recent coupon
settlements involving air travel and vehicles (General Motors trucks, Ford Bronco II utility
vehicles, and Ford Mustang convertibles). In addition, f\.1r. Morrison was counsel for the
class plaintiffs in the Goldfarb case, discussed in Part I, and both authors have represented
plaintiffs in numerous class actions involving challenges to state and federal regulatory and
public benefit programs brought principally for injunctive and declaratory relief. They recognize that having worked on the cases discussed in this Article is both a plus and a minus.
In one sense, they may be too close to the cases to see all of their benefits, or-in cases like
the heart-valve case, where their client ultimately withdrew its objections after changes
were made-to see all of their failings. On the other hand, the authors' intimate involvement with many of these cases has allowed them to provide details that are not available
from the reported decisions, but are nevertheless pertinent to the problems that they have
encountered.
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INTRODUCriON

The thesis of this Article is straightfonvard. Class actions are important and useful, both to deter wrongful conduct and to provide
compensation for injured plaintiffs. They work reasonably well in
simple cases. But as matters become increasingly complex, problems
surface that require protection of class members whose interests do
not coincide with those of the class representatives and the class attorneys. We will refer to those individuals as "unrepresented" class
members, although we recognize that they are technically represented
by the designated class representatives and the designated class
counsel.
Our main concerns do not arise in cases that are actually litigated,
although there are potential difficulties even in those situations.
Rather, our concerns principally surface in "settlement class actions."
As we use the term, "settlement class action" refers not simply to class
actions that settle, but to cases in which the class certification issue
itself is settled, usually with the defendant maintaining that the class
may be certified only for settlement purposes, but not if the case is
litigated.! In these situations, the existing controls used in class actions to assure that the unrepresented are adequately protected are
not effective, and new tools are required to assure that the unrepresented do not lose substantial rights or are not prejudiced by the manner in which these settlement class actions are resolved.
In Part I of this Article, we examine simple class actions and explain the problems of representing the unrepresented and how existing provisions are designed to, and largely do, alleviate those
problems. Next, in Part II, we examine several situations that illustrate the representational problems under the existing class action system and show why the current controls are not effective. Fmally, in
Part m, we provide a specific set of recommendations for changes in
the way courts handle class actions. All of the cases we examine involve claims for payment of money, usually as the sole or primary
element of relief, but sometimes as one of several claims.

1 See Manual for Complex Litigation Third § 30.45 (1995) (explaining that settlement
agreements provide for certification of classes for settlement purposes only}.
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I
REPRESENTATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE "SIMPLE"
CLASS ACTION

Twenty years ago, then-Federal Judge Marvin Frankel described
our litigation system as an "umpireal" one, in which courts act like
umpires-calling balls and strikes or deciding whether a player is out
or safe-and the parties slug it out, with the umpire looking over their
shoulders.2 Under this theory, there is no need for substantive review
of the fairness of litigation or settlement because all of the parties
(other than minors and incompetents) are assumed able to protect
themselves. This analogy is applicable where, for example, a corporation sues a third party and any money recovered goes into the corporate treasury. In such circumstances, most people would agree that
little or no court supervision is necessary. In more complex litigations,
however, the "umpireal" model fails to deal with special problems
that arise.
A.

The Shareholder Derivative Suit

Perhaps the clearest illustration of the kind of problem not addressed by the "umpireal" model is the shareholder derivative action
in which a plaintiff seeks the recovery of a sum of money for the benefit of the corporation of which the plaintiff is a shareholder. Originally, provisions governing these actions were part of Rule 23 of the
Federal Ru1es of Civil Procedure dealing with class action requirements. Since 1966, however, they have been included in the separate,
but analytically similar, Rule 23.1. 3 Technically, these cases are not
class actions, because any recovery will go to the corporation rather
than to the individual shareholders. Each shareholder, however, benefits in proportion to that shareholder's interest in the stock of the
company; and, in that sense, shareholders are a class. In derivative
actions, everyone "in the class" wins, loses, or compromises on the
basis of the overall outcome. Yet, even in this situation, the Rules
recognize that the "class" needs special protections that would not be
required in the traditional lawsuit involving only named plaintiffs and
named defendants.
The problem arises in the derivative suit because the plaintiff's
lawyer is paid a contingent fee, and the corporation would be tempted
to buy off the lawyer in a settlement involving a large attorney's fee,
under which the company-and, thus, its shareholders-would re2

Marvin E. Frankel, "The Search for 'fruth: An Umpireal View," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.

1031, 1033-34 (1975).
3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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ceive little or no benefit. The likelihood of this occurring is particularly great if the real defendant, the party from whom the recovery is
sought, is a corporate insider who has close connections to the board
which approves the settlement and, most importantly, the payment to
the plaintiff's lawyer.
In order to avoid these problems, Rule 23.1 provides two types of
protection. Frrst, before a settlement can be finalized, notice must be
given to other shareholders since, if the settlement is approved, it will
preclude future derivative claims by all shareholders, not simply by
the named plaintiff. Second, the court must undertake a substantive
fairness determination of both the settlement and the fees, deciding
whether the compromise is a fair, adequate, and reasonable one, but
not whether the plaintiff has recovered everything available if the case
had been tried and won. Commentators recognize that this substantive review is not perfect, because reasonableness is not a precise term
with respect either to merits or to fees. But by comparing the actual
recovery in settlement with the optimal potential recovery, and then
taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the various claims
and defenses, the courts should be able to eliminate the worst abuses.
B.

The Problem of Insuring Proportional Compensation

The next level of complexity involves a simple class action in
which the class is seeking primarily monetary relief. If settlement is
reached, the settlement must be divided among individual class members who may be differently situated from one another. This problem
arose in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,4 in which the Supreme Court
found that the Vrrginia State Bar and several local bar associations
had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act through their minimum fee
schedule systems and remanded the case for a determination of the
damages due the class.s By resolving the liability issue, the Supreme
Court simplified the case. It did not, however, eliminate the potential
problem of properly allocating money damages within the class.
The class in Goldfarb included approximately 2400 homeowners
in Reston. Vrrginia, who had purchased their homes within the period
covered by the statute of limitations. Their claims were based on the
fact that, because of the minimum fee schedules, the amounts that
their attorneys had charged them for title examinations and title opinions for their homes had been determined by the fee schedule, not the
market. That charge equaled one percent of the purchase price for
the first $50,000 and a smaller percentage thereafter.

u.s. 773 {1975).

4

421

5

Id. at 792-93.
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After some negotiations, defendants agreed to pay a fixed sum of
money to resolve the suit, and the question then became how the
money should be allocated within the class and between the class and
its attorneys. The problem of determining the proper share for attorneys out of the settlement fund is like that in the shareholder derivative suit. 6 However, achieving a fair allocation of the settlement fund
among the differently situated class members raised separate
questions.
For example, one question that could have been asked, but was
not, was why the class should be limited to Reston homeowners and
not include all home buyers in Virginia-or even Northern Virginia,
or simply Fairfax County, where Reston is located-so that they, too,
could have the benefits of class counsel's efforts. A larger class surely
would have reduced the amount recoverable by the existing class,
since the ability of the defendants to pay in this situation was limited.
In this case, there was a good reason why the class was so defined:
The developers in Reston, but not elsewhere, had utilized the services
of a small group of attorneys for title examination work and were
charged very low rates. In return, the developers inserted these attorneys' names in the contracts for the homes, which enabled these attorneys to gamer most, if not all, of the business on the initial sale of the
homes. Moreover, the ruling on the basic liability issue benefitted not
only the class, but also, on a prospective basis, all Virginia residents,
and probably everyone in the United States who needed the services
of an attorney. Nonetheless, the fact that there was no "natural class"
illustrates the potential difficulties of defining a class in more complicated situations.
Even within the class, there was a serious question as to how to
calculate the amount of damages suffered by each member of the
class. For instance, was it appropriate to assume that a uniform percentage of each fee was an overcharge, in which case all of the claimants would recover proportionately to the amount of the fees paid? In
those circumstances, homeowners with inexpensive homes might have
received very little or nothing, whereas others, who paid more for
their homes, and hence more for their title examinations, would receive much more. On the other hand, it could be argued that the
work done-examining a title and writing a brief opinion letter-was
the same regardless of the purchase price, and that, therefore, the reasonable charge should be the same across the board, with anything
above it unlawful. Opposing this was the argument that the attorney's
higher fee for more expensive homes was justified because of the po6

See supra Part I.A.
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tentially greater risk if there had been a defect in the title, but that
theory did not turn out to be factually defensible. Furthermore, the
named plaintiffs were a husband and wife who had purchased a
higher-priced home, and thus their judgment on the reasonableness of
the allocation arguably might be affected by their self-interest.
In the end, it turned out that there was very little real dollar difference among the various allocation methods. In part for simplicity
purposes, a percentage figure was used, and the average recovery was
about $139, based on an average home price of about $40,000 for
which attorneys' fees of $400 would have been payable. Thus, despite
the potential complexities, the existing protections of notice to the
class members and a substantive fairness review by the district court
of the total amount of payment, the allocation among class members,
and the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, worked tolerably well.
C.

Problems of Definition, Notice, and Allocation

On the next level of complexity, but still within the bounds of the
fairly straightforward class action, would be the example of a securities class action alleging that the required securities filings included
false statements or failed to disclose material facts. If we assume that
the class was or could have been properly certified under Rule
23(b)(3),7 there would appear to be three complexities not present in
Goldfarb.
First, it would be more difficult to determine who was in and who
was out of the class, especially if either the increase in the price of the
stock or its ultimate decline was more or less gradual. Second, there
would be much greater difficulty in providing notice to all of the class
members because of changing addresses and the changing composition of the class (as people bought and sold stock);8 as a result, there
would be less assurance that interested persons would be heard regarding the fairness of the settlement. Third, the timing of the
purchase and eventual sale among the class members would have
much greater significance in terms of each class member's entitlement
to recover than was the case in Goldfarb.
Despite these complexities, current class action Rules seem to be
able to handle this kind of case. As to the first problem, the defendant's self-interest may be of help. On the one hand, the defendant
does not want the class to be too large because a large class \vill dilute
7 Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
8 According to Census Bureau data, in recent years between 16% and 18% of Ameri-

cans move each year. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract
of the United States tbl. 34 at 32 (113th ed. 1993); The World Almanac 394 (1993}.
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each individual's potential payment. On the other hand, if the class is
not sufficiently large, the litigation will not be over, and a significant
number of other claims may have to be defended, despite the defendant's wishes to buy eternal peace.9 In addition, the relatively short
statutes of limitations now applicable to securities actions may help to
assure that all possible class claims are filed within a brief period of
time, thus sorting out the class definition, albeit with some theoretical
problems. Of course, this will be possible only if all those who may be
injured have already been injured so that they can make an informed
choice about issues such as opting out and settlement.
Second, while notice cannot reach everyone, in cases where the
parties know in advance that many class members cannot be reached
individually by mail, the case law generally demands that extensive
publication notice be undertaken. 1o Moreover, individual notice
should be able to reach representatives within each of the various potential subclasses, or at least subcategories in the larger class, provided
that the notice is widely disseminated.
The third problem-regarding the timing of the purchase of the
stock-is the most significant, especially since the named plaintiffs
cannot be similarly situated vis-a-vis the defendants in the same way
as are all of the remaining subgroups within the class. But to the extent that timing is the determinative element in the amount that each
class member is entitled to receive, general rules of recovery under
applicable securities law, combined with a theory of allocation based
on the timing of specific events, can resolve most, if not all, of the
problems in a reasonable manner. Even though there are problems of
allocation, all of the injuries have occurred, and so, once the specific
events are isolated and their significance is determined, the allocation
for each class member should be rather simple.
Finally, despite the greater complexity in the substantive claim,
there are no particular difficulties with attorneys' fees, beyond those
which are found in every one of these class actions: The plaintiffs'
9 See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 154-55 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (rejecting objection that class action defendant's desire to be sued by claimants worldwide, rather than just
by claimants in United States, was evidence of collusion with class counsel, because desire
to seek "corporate peace" was in defendant's self-interest).
10 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145,167-68,175 (2d Cir.
1987) (concluding that letter notice along with announcements in national publications and
on radio and television was adequate notice where member of class could not be located
through reasonable means), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); In re Domestic Air 'll'ansp.
Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 311 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (concluding that where all potential
class members could not be reached by mailed notice, plaintiffs had to publish notice in 67
newspapers); see also 7B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1786
at 206-07 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing requirement of publication campaign to reach class
members who cannot be notified individually by mail).
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attorney always has a very strong incentive to settle because no fees
will be received until the matter is resolved, and no fees will be received at all if the case is lost.
II

NEw PRoBLEMS

IN CoMPLEX CLASS AcnoNs

If institutional controls for dealing with representational

problems in simple class actions are in place and work tolerably well,
the same cannot be said of the new class actions, many of which involve classes composed principally of persons injured or yet to be injured by defective products. In these cases, the victims are placed
together in a settlement class even though, under traditional class action notions, they could not be joined if the cases were actually litigated, even in a Rule 23(b)(3) class, because of enormous factual
disparities among the class members and, in nationwide cases where
state substantive law applies, because of immense choice-of-law difficulties.11 As noted at the beginning of this Article, ordinarily, the defendant's willingness to consent to a class is conditioned on there
being a settlement.
Although there are many variations on the theme, this part of the
Article will discuss three cases in which settlement classes were sought
and granted under Rule 23(b)(3): (1) the asbestos case involving the
twenty defendants that comprise the Center for Claims Resolution
(CCR), Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.;12 (2) the silicone-gel
breast-implant case;13 and (3) the natiomvide class action for economic damages concerning General Motors trucks with an alleged
propensity to explode in side-impact crashes.14 The focus of this discussion will be not on the merits of these settlements, but on the rep11 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300-02 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 {1995} {deciding that partial grant of class certification was improper
in nationwide illY-hemophilia litigation due to differing state standards of negligence).
But cf. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995) (granting class
certification on certain liability issues and punitive damages in litigation concerning effects
of tobacco addiction on class of all nicotine-dependent U.S. residents and other smokers
who have been advised of tobacco's health effects, but denying certification with respect to
compensatory damages and affirmative defenses}, rev'd, No. 95-30725, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11815 (5th Cir. May 23, 1996).
12 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994}, vacated and remanded, Nos. 94-1925 et al., 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11191 {3d Cir. May 10, 1996).
13 In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL
578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
14 In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 846 F. Supp.
330 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd, 55 F.3d 768 {3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995}.
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resentational problems created in these situations, which lead to
substantive problems for the unrepresented class members.ts
A. The CCR-Asbestos Settlement
In recent years, the number of asbestos personal-injury claims
filed in state and federal courts has become quite large. By 1990, six
percent of the new federal civil filings were asbestos related.t6 On
July 29, 1991, citing an asbestos litigation crisis, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation transferred all federal asbestos personal-injury
litigation to the Honorable Charles Weiner of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania for the purpose of seeking solutions to the pending asbestos litigationP After the transfer order, attempts at a global asbestos litigation settlement involving a wide array of defendants and
many of the leaders of the plaintiffs' bar were made, but failed.ts
Thereafter, in late 1991 or early 1992, a consortium of twenty
companies regularly sued in asbestos litigation-known as the Center
for Claims Resolution (CCR)-approached two prominent members
of the plaintiffs' asbestos bar in an attempt to negotiate a settlement
of all future asbestos claims against the CCR defendants.t9 These
plaintiffs' attorneys and CCR struck an agreement in early 1993 under
which future claims against the twenty CCR companies would be resolved, not in the tort system, but under an alternative dispute resolution system set up in the agreement and administered largely by the
CCR.zo

The settlement in the CCR case, which the district court in Philadelphia has approved,21 presents three special problems of representation.22 The first is: Who is in and who is out of the class? In the
simple class actions discussed above and the silicone-gel breast15 Another problem of relatively recent vintage is the attempt to use Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)-which does not provide class members the right to opt out-to
resolve mass-tort class actions. We address this problem briefly in Appendix A to this
Article.
16 Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 265.
17 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415, 416 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
18 See Georgine, 151 F.R.D. at 266-67 (recounting history of failed settlement
negotiations).
19 Id. at 266.
20 See id. at 267 (describing CCR's administrative role in implementing settlement
agreement); see also Susan Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1045, 1051-53 (1995) (describing process leading up to filing of Georgine).
21 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 325 (holding that settlement is "fair, adequate, and reasonable to the class").
22 The district court's subsequent order enjoining the absent class members from maintaining any asbestos personal-injury suit against the CCR defendants in state or federal
court is on appeal to the Third Circuit, while other matters are being delayed pending the
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implant case discussed below, the classes include the entire universe of
current and potential victims with claims against these defendants. By
contrast, the class in Georgine was defined to include only those individuals who had not filed lawsuits on or before the date the class action was filed (which was also the date that the answer and class action
settlement were filed).23 Anyone who filed a claim before the prescribed date was not part of the class and thus was not limited to the
alternative dispute resolution provisions in the settlement, the limitations on diseases covered, and the caps on amounts that could be paid,
all of which were applicable to the settlement class.24
Whether these substantive limitations on the right to compensation are fair in light of other benefits of the settlement is a complicated question. But that question is overshadowed by a series of
representational problems that arose because the same lawyers who
represented the settlement class represented the "nonclass" plaintiffs
in thousands of separate cases and settled them on different and, we
believe, demonstrably more favorable terms than those available to
the class members. We seriously doubt that such dual representation
is permissible because we do not believe that counsel in such a situation can ever adequately explain why the class and nonclass members,
who appear similarly, if not identically, situated, obtained such different deals.
1.

The Problem of Dual Representation

The class counsel in Georgine settled approximately 14,000 of
their clients' pending claims against the CCR defendants for approximately $215 million shortly before the class action settlement was
entry of a final judgment See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., Nos. 94-1925 et al (3d
Cir. argued Nov. 21, 1995).
23 Since the filing of Georgine, two other nationwide class actions have also defined the
class to exclude all individuals who had pending litigation against the defendants. See
Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.RD. 505, 517 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (defining non-opt-out
class in settlement agreement with non-CCR asbestos manufacturers as "persons who have
neither filed nor settled ... claims before August 27, 1993"), appeal docketed, No. 9540635 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 1995); Beeman v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-47363 (fex. Dist. Ct. Harris
County Nov. 1994) (concerning claims against manufacturers of defective plastic pipes
used in houses and mobile homes). In Beeman, the court denied the parties' motion for
preliminary approval. Beeman, No. 93-47363 (fex. Dist. Ct. Harris County Feb. 16, 1995)
(order denying plaintiffs' and defendants' motion for preliminary approval of settlement).
24 In these types of class actions-brought principally to resolve state-law "claims" of
plaintiffs who presently do not suffer from a compensable injury-there are also serious
questions involving whether the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1994) and Article III's case-or-controversy requirement have been satisfied. See U.S.
Const. art III, § 2. We take up those issues in Appendix B to this Article.
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presented to the court for approval on January 15, 1993.25 A strong
argument can be made that the settlement amounts for the class in
Georgine were not comparable to either the amounts that plaintiffs
generally receive or the amounts that nonclass plaintiffs who settled
on the eve of Georgine received. We acknowledge that the settling
parties and the disti:ict court disagreed with this argument,26 but that
is not our concern here.
In at least two situations, class members will receive no monetary
compensation, unlike pre-January 15, 1993 settling plaintiffs who were
paid damages for similar, if not identical, claims. Ftrst, some plaintiffs
were individuals suffering from pleural disease, which involves
asbestos-related "plaques" on the outside of the lung, but little or no
physical impairment. Under the class action settlement, pleural claimants receive no cash, but only what the settling parties referred to as a
"bundle of benefits," such as waiver of the statute of limitations and
the right to be compensated for both a nonmalignant and malignant
condition if the need should arise. However, the clients who settled
by January 15, 1993, received substantial money for the identical
disease. 27
Second, the outside settlements included lung-cancer victims,
who only needed to show that they were occupationally exposed to
CCR asbestos and had lung cancer. However, the class members will
have to demonstrate that they were exposed to CCR products in the
workplace for a significant number of years and that their lung cancer
was asbestos related, in general, by providing evidence of underlying
asbestosis, a showing that the settling parties conceded was more diffi-

25 Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and Defendants Repre·
sented by the Center for Claims Resolution, Settling Parties' Exhibits 302A, 302B, 302C, &
303, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 93-0215), va·
cated and remanded, Nos. 94-1925 et al., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11191 (3d Cir. May 10,
1996) [hereinafter Georgine SOS]. With respect to many of the 14,000 cases, class counsel
had associated with other plaintiffs' counsel around the nation with whom their fee would
be shared. Id.
26 See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 305-11 (discussing court's conclusion that settlement was
noncollusive).
27 From its inception through January 15, 1993, CCR settled its nonmalignant claims for
an average of $8143 per claim, including zero-dollar dispositions. Georgine SOS, supra
note 25, Settling Parties' Exhibit 504. The nonmalignant category includes pleural claims
of the type for which no cash payment is made under the Georgine settlement. None the·
less, the settling parties maintained that the settlement represented an improvement over
the present system under which claimants compensated for one disease generally released
the right to "come back" and obtain relief for another future disease. If the settlement
were so attractive, it is surprising that none of the pre-January 15, 1993 settlements for class
counsel's 14,000 clients preferred the "bundle of benefits" over the money offered.
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cult than what the tort system required.28 Thus, class members who
are unable to present such evidence \vill be denied compensation
while pre-January 15th plaintiffs were paid damages for similar claims.

2.

The Problem of Future Injury

The second representational problem in Georgine is that, by definition, the class representatives for the future plaintiffs did not have a
claim on the date the case was filed and had no present injuries for
which they were seeking compensation. Indeed, unlike the class in the
breast-implant case, which included substantial numbers of current
and future claimants (because the class swept in the thousands of
pending cases around the nation), this was almost entirely a "futures"
class when the case was filed, although the diseases of a relatively
small number of class members became manifest as the case proceeded in the district court, and some relatively small number of class
members were impaired at the time the case was filed (including several of the named plaintiffs).
This lack of current injury created two interrelated problems.
First, the class members had no way of knowing whether they would
ever need any of the benefits under the plan (and if so, which ones),
or whether their injuries would be covered. As a result, they were
asked to make a purely hypothetical judgment about the reasonableness of the settlement, thereby eliminating one of the checks on class
counsel who had, in this case, even more so than in others, substantial
financial incentives to settle with the defendants.2 9
28 See Georgine SOS, supra note 25, Settling Parties' Exhibit 300 at 26-28, 44-46 (setting forth procedures for claimants seeking compensation under lung cancer category).
29 Those incentives were threefold. First, the Settlement Agreement provides that the
court may award fees and expenses for the prosecution of the class action, which will be
paid by the CCR defendants. Georgine SOS, supra note 25, at 92. Second, the settlement
of the 14,000 pending cases for $215 million probably generated fees for class counsel, and
their associated counsel, at the standard contingent rates of 33% or more. These settlements, by CCR's admission, were only entered into when CCR became reasonably certain
that the class action settlement would come to fruition, Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 295, thus
making it reasonable to consider the settlement of the pending cases as part of class counsel's incentive for the overall deal, despite the district court's contrary finding. Id. at 296.
Third, class counsel was free to represent individual claimants in the settlement's claims
procedures, generally at a 25% contingent fee, Georgine SOS, supra note 25, at 93, and the
class action notice materials noted that class counsel would be available for that purpose.
Joint Motion of Settling Parties for Approval of Notice to Class, Exhibit A at 17, 23,25-26,
A-12, Exhibit B at 8, Georgine (No. 93-0215); cf. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 304 (discussing
potential conflict of interest in serving both as class counsel and counsel for individual
claimants, and indicating that court would appoint additional class counsel as future
monitors of class settlement, but would not disqualify class counsel as counsel for individual claimants).
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The second, related problem involves the illusory nature of the
opt-out right for the future class members. Since the class member
had no current injury, it was an extraordinary leap of faith to assume
that he or she could make an informed choice about whether or not
class treatment was a sensible one. If all injuries were covered, the
choice would not have been as difficult. However, as noted above and
described more fully below, not all injuries compensable under state
law will be compensated by this settlement, and in that sense, the
choice was little more than a wild gamble, with no basis to support
staying in or opting out.
The problem here is made even more troubling by the fact that
many of the victims did not even know that they were in the class, in
contrast with the silicone-gel breast-implant case, discussed below,
where the plaintiffs realize that they have been "exposed" to the product. Furthermore, the latency period for diseases related to asbestos
and other environmental toxins can be extremely long, and at least
some diseases-for instance, mesothelioma for asbestos victims-can
result from a relatively brief exposure many years before. Although
most asbestos victims worked for long periods of time in occupations
where there were high levels of asbestos, others worked for brief periods of time, perhaps during a summer at a shipyard while in college,
and others were exposed to asbestos wholly apart from any of their
work experiences.3o Thus, for many victims, the onset of disease is
their first recognition that they were ever part of any class, as was the
case for two of the class representatives in Georgine who never suspected, until their spouses died from asbestos-related injuries, that
either they or their spouses had been exposed to asbestos.31 For this
category of persons, even if they saw a notice, they would not have
any reason to believe that it applied to them. The notion that the
right to opt out is a meaningful protection against arbitrary decisions
by class representatives is simply inapplicable in this context.32
30 The class definition in Georgine included individuals who were occupationally exposed to asbestos products with respect to which CCR may bear legal liability and persons
who lived with such individuals. Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 257-58. Thus the class included
individuals whose only exposure to asbestos was, for example, from the clothing of an
exposed individual. Indeed, one named plaintiff's wife apparently contracted mesothe·
lioma in that manner. Testimony of 1Y Annas, Hearing 'Il"anscript at 228 (Feb. 24, 1994),
Georgine (No. 93-0215). The class also included the spouses and other relatives of both
groups, so as to cover, and then eliminate without any paynient, all claims for loss of
consortium.
31 Deposition Testimony of Laverne Winbun and Nafssica Kekrides, Joint App. at
1135-37, 1150-52, Georgine (No. 93-0215).
32 In Georgine, notification was attempted through newspaper advertisements, public·
service announcements, and television spots in almost all, if not all, of the major markets
and in some national magazines (such as Parade). An effort was made to enlist the support
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A practical example that serves to demonstrate the inadequate
representation of the future class members is the failure of the
Georgine settlement to account for inflation. Simply put, in mass-tort
cases in which fixed-dollar recoveries are established to pay monetary
compensation, unless there is an inflation factor built into the settlement, future victims will receive far less real compensation than those
who are eligible for compensation now. Under the Georgine settlement, the vast majority of class members who demonstrate that they
have compensable illnesses will be paid through an administrative
claims process according to preset monetary ranges for each type of
disease.33 Thus, for example, a claimant who contracts mesothelioma
will receive anywhere from $20,000 to $200,000, but the average settlement must fall within what the settlement terms a "negotiated average
value range" (NAVR), which, for mesothelioma, is between $37,000
and $60,000. This means that, in approximately ninety-eight percent
of all cases, the average payment for mesothelioma cannot exceed
$60,000.34
of several dozen unions whose membership had been exposed occupationally to asbestos,
principally by asking the unions to include small advertisements about the case in their
membership newsletters. Despite this considerable effort, of the seven class representatives who were questioned during their depositions on the subject, six stated that they saw
neither the print nor the electronic advertisements. Deposition Testimony of Timothy
Murphy, Carlos Raver, 1}' Annas, Ambrose Vogt. Nafssica Kekrides, and Laverne Win bun,
Joint App. at 1127-28, 1146-47, 1184-85, 1164, 1155, & 1138-39, Georgine (No. 93-0215).
Given the fact that asbestos and other environmental toxins often do their damage insidiously and that most Georgine class members were not currently injured, we suspect that for
many class members who literally saw some form of the notice, it simply did not register.
Cf. Schweitzer v. Reading Co., 758 F.2d 936, 943-44 (3d Cir.) (noting that, in bankruptcy
case, it would be "absurd" to expect individuals exposed to asbestos who were not impaired and had no personal notice of proceedings to have filed claim to preserve future
cause of action; holding that unimpaired individuals did not have "claims" that could be
discharged under Bankruptcy Code), cert denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
33 Fewer than one percent of all claimants who qualify for compensation will be permitted to seek binding arbitration or file suit in the tort system. Georgine SOS, supra note 25,
at 67; see Georgine, 157 F.RD. at 281 & n2.7. In addition, there are a series of procedural
and substantive restrictions on this right, not the least of which is that the plaintiff may not
seek to recover punitive damages of any kind. The settling parties justified this latter restriction on the ground that, during CCR's history, no CCR defendant had been subject to
a punitive damage award, a point which seems inapposite since the ability to seek punitive
damages adds to a case's worth, regardless of whether the case is tried to verdict. As CCR
noted in Georgine, over its history, CCR settled 99.8% of its cases, Response of CCR
Defendants to the Order To Show Cause at 27 n.8 (Mar. 17, 1993), Georgine (No. 93-0215),
so its verdict history does not provide much evidence with regard to punitive or compensatory damages. We note, however, that asbestos cases do account for a substantial percentage of all punitive damage awards in product liability cases. Michael Rustad, In Defense of
Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78
Iowa L. Rev. 1, 38 (1992).
34 See Georgine, 157 F.RD. at 337 (showing ranges for each compensable disease).
The settlement provides that between zero and three percent of all eligible mesothelioma

454

NEW YORK UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 71:439

The objectors to the settlement argued that the top values of
these ranges were themselves below recent historical CCR settlement
values and were thus unfair. For present purposes, we accept the district court's implicit finding-which was urged by the settling plaintiffs-that the top end of each NAVR was consistent with historical
settlements paid by CCR in approximately 130,000 prior suits. However, these amounts are frozen in place for the first ten years of the
settlement regardless of increases in the cost of living. In the eleventh
year, the payment ranges may be increased, up to twenty percent,
under a provision allowing the parties to attempt to negotiate new
values and to submit the question to binding arbitration if the negotiations faiJ.35
Two problems with this system are evident. First, from years two
through ten of the settlement, future victims will receive, in real terms,
less, and possibly far less, than present victims who recover in year
one. Second, if history is any guide, the possibility of an increase in
year ten does very little to deal with the problem of inflation. Even
making the extremely generous assumption that the full twenty percent increase is provided in year eleven, that increase would be
lower-generally much lower-than increases in the cost of living in
each of the past five decades. Increases in the Consumer Price Index
for all urban consumers (CPI-U) during the last five decades were as
follows: 1940s-68.6%; 1950s-24.6%; 1960s-28.2%; 1970s103.4%; and 1980s-64.4%.36
Moreover, since an adjustment in the compensation values can
only be done after year ten, by the end of year twenty, the erosion
from inflation-again, even assuming that the full twenty percent adjustment was given-could be staggering. For instance, in the twenty
years prior to January 1994, when CCR began processing claims under
the Georgine settlement, the CPI-U increased by 215.6%. Thus, there

claims can be considered "extraordinary" for which the average award may not exceed
$300,000. Id. The averages for extraordinary claims also are not adjusted for Inflation.
35 Georgine SOS, supra note 25, at 51-52. The settlement does not indicate, nor did the
settling parties ever argue, that the possibility of an increase in the settlement compensa·
tion values was intended to deal with inflation. More likely, the increase was intended to
deal with other changes in the tort system, such as the possibility that future non-CCR
asbestos bankruptcies would increase the liability share of the CCR defendants.
In any event, it will be very difficult for class counsel to negotiate an increase, let alone
one of20%, because each defendant has the right to walk away from the settlement at the
end of year 10 for any reason, even though the class members are bound to the settlement
in perpetuity. Id. at 8, 10, 95-96.
36 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (Jan. 1913-Jan. 1994).

April-May 1996}

REPRESENTING THE UNREPRESENTED

455

is a real possibility that compensation values paid under Georgine will
be of very little real value.37
In responding to the inflation problem, the settling parties relied
almost exclusively on the testimony of a plaintiffs' asbestos personalinjury lawyer who said that his settlements did not take inflation into
account.38 But individual, or even aggregate, settlements of cases involving current injuries would generally take into account the strength
of those cases and current settlement values, not the need to compensate uninjured people well into the future. Although the district court
rejected the settling parties' argument.39 it nonetheless upheld the
lack of inflation adjustment, apparently because it comprised only one
element of the settlement:
[T]he CCR defendants presented no evidence ... to rebut the Objectors' argument that a settlement agreement that settles future
cases over the course of ten years should indeed contain an adjustment for inflation.... [A] picture perfect negotiator ... might have
insisted on and achieved an adjustment for inflation. However, the
Court also finds that the absence of such an adjustment does not
render the Stipulation unreasonable or unfair when viewed as a
37 To illustrate this problem, the following table shows the current Georgine maximums, in the first column, compared to those figures increased by 20%, in the second
column. Columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the Georgine compensation values adjusted by SO%,
100%, 150%, and 200%. The 20% adjustment column provides a useful reference point
for considering the inflation problem in Georgine, since 20% is the maximum adjustment
that can be made for years 11 through 20 of the settlemenL As noted in the text, even the
200% increase is less than the increase in the cost of living over the past t\vo decades.
Unadjusted
20%
50%
100%
150%
200%
Mesothelioma
60,000
n,OOO
90,000
120,000
150,000
180,000
Lung Cancer
30,000
36,000
45,000
60,000
75,000
90,000
Other Cancer
12,500
15,000
18,750
25,000
31,250
37,500
Nonmalignant
7,500
9,000
11,250
15,000
18,750
22,500
This general problem of inflation is exacerbated by the trend in recent years for inflation for medical care to rise at considerably higher rates than inflation generally. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers, U.S. City Average for "Medical Care" (Jan. 14, 1994) (showing that. in 20-year
period ending in December 1993, the consumer price index for medical care rose by
415.6% ). Thus, simply projecting past general inflation into the future understates the potential for inflation-driven hardship on class members because medical care, while representing only a small percentage of general inflation indices, comprises a much higher
percentage of the cost of living for many people suffering from serious diseases, as would
be the case for all eligible claimants in a mass-tort settlement that sought to compensate
class members for serious physical injuries. See Theodore Eisenberg & James A.
Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 731,
787 (1992) ("Medical costs are the major component of awards in the serious product liability cases likely to reach trial or likely to result in large pretrial settlements.").
38 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.RD. 246,278 & n.24 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(referring to testimony of Robert Hatten), vacated and remanded, Nos. 94-1925 et al., 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 11191 {3d Cir. May 10, 1996).
39 Id.
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whole in light of the significant advantages presented to the class
members.40

While the district court was correct in recognizing the ravages of
inflation, it erred in failing to appreciate the representational problem.
Plaintiffs' counsel did not, as the district court's opinion seems to assume, merely trade off one right of a class member for another right of
that same class member (something that is standard fare in any settlement negotiation); rather, in refusing to insist on inflation protection
for the future class, class counsel traded off the rights of certain class
members for those of other class members. In other words, since
CCR was willing to pay up to $1.3 billion to the class as a whole over
the first ten years of the settlement-which was the contention accepted by the district court41 -then the payments to presently injured
class members should have been reduced to allow future claimants to
obtain equivalent value through inflation-adjusted awards, if CCR
were to remain within its $1.3 billion ten-year budget.42

3.

The Problem of Abrogation of Claims

The final adequacy of representation issue in Georgine involves
the decision of the settling plaintiffs' counsel to exclude certain categories of illnesses from any recovery whatsoever, even though it is
undisputed that persons with such conditions presently are recovering
substantial amounts in settlements or litigation in the tort system. The
justification for such a decision is that there is only a certain amount
of money available for compensating class members, and class counsel
believe that those who are most seriously injured should receive their
compensation and that other "less-deserving" victims should be denied compensation entirely. Further, the settling parties argued that
certain nonmonetary benefits, such as waivers of statutes of limitations and the right to be compensated for more than one disease, justified the abrogation of claims that were concededly valid under state
40 Id. (citations omitted). The district court considered the impact of inHation only
over the course of 10 years, even though the settlement binds class members in perpetuity.
It is reasonable to believe, given the age of some class members (one class representative
was only 42), and the latency period for some of the relevant diseases, that the settlement
will have significant impact for as many as 30 years, at which time the lack of an inHation
factor will render some of the awards virtually meaningless.
41 See id. at 287 (describing defendants' "worst-case" assumption of $1.289 billion over
first 10 years).
42 This would have been difficult to pull off because it would have been obvious that
the amounts payable to presently injured claimants were well below CCR's historical settlement values. In other words, as a practical matter, without shortchanging the future
claimants, CCR would have had to put up much more than $1.3 billion for the first 10
years.
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law.43 That kind of a determination, in which one group within the
class is deliberately favored over another group, raises the most serious questions of adequacy of representation.
The problem of class counsel imposing their notions of which
claimants are more or less deserving is most starkly presented by the
decision to exclude claims for loss of consortium in both Georgine and
the silicone-gel breast-implant case.44 Although such claims are recognized in most states, both settlements eliminated them entirely,
even though in some cases a spouse would be able to collect significant damages, for example, where a husband had to quit his job to
stay home and care for his injured wife and small children. Both district judges gave short shrift to loss-of-consortium claims in approving
settlements that gave all the money to the primary victims.4 s And, not
only are the spouses denied all compensation, but they are denied the
right to opt out on their own, even though in many states, loss-ofconsortium claimants have "independent" claims that may be asserted
separately even if the spouses settle their claims.46 Ironically, the failure to set aside even a small amount of money for loss-of-consortium
claims may increase the leverage, and possibly even the legal viability,
of claims by husbands (and perhaps even former husbands) to part of
the settlement that the women will receive in the silicone-gel breastimplant case, on the theory that claims of spouses are merged into
those of the primary victim.
This problem is of a wholly different kind than that involved in
the simple class action where the decisions on who will recover, and
See, e.g., supra note 26 (discussing abrogation of class members' pleural claims).
See infra Part III.B.l.
See Georgine, 157 F.RD. at 278 ("This Court finds that the CCR defendants' historical averages, upon which the compensation values are based, include payment for loss-ofconsortium claims, and, accordingly, the compensation schedule is not unfair for this
ascribed reason."); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P10000-S, 1994 WL578353, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Sept 1, 1994) (noting that "[s]pecial problems
presented in a proposed class action such as this should be viewed as justifying the court's
exercise of equitable powers in these circumstances, notwithstanding an arguable interference with the rights of a husband"). But see Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.RD. 138, 140
(S.D. Ohio 1992) (interim order noting court's concern that settlement does not provide
spousal benefits and instructing settling parties to report back on this and other issues);
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.RD. 141, 169-70 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (approving revised settlement that made substantial awards to spouses).
46 See Antonios P. Tsarouhas, Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc.: The Derivative and Independent Approach to Spousal Consortium, 19 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 987, 990-93 & n.43 (1993)
(discussing case law from numerous states where rule is that loss-of-consortium plaintiffs
are not bound by their spouses' decisions to settle or release their own claims); cf. Schafer
v. American Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 5-7 {1st Cir. 1994) (state-law claim of loss of consortium not preempted after injured child obtained a substantial judgment from Vaccine
Court under National Childhood Vaccine Act, in large part because Vaccine Act provides
no separate award for individuals claiming loss of consortium).
43
44
45
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for what injuries, were based on factors, such as causation and likelihood of recovery, that are well within the bounds of the law. Here, by
contrast, class counsel, in effect, decided, as a matter of policy, that the
law was not right and that settlement funds should be allocated in
accordance with what class counsel believed was fair, not with what
the law would otherwise mandate. This is not a situation in which
differences in the law, such as variations in the amounts recoverable in
different jurisdictions, are leveled out or overlooked in the interest of
economy and efficiency. Those kinds of concerns might apply if there
were reductions in the amounts available for these other uncompensated diseases rather than, as in the CCR settlement, the elimination
of such payments entirely.4 7
B.

Silicone-Gel Breast Implants

During the 1970s, various companies began marketing siliconegel-filled breast implants in the United States and thereafter abroad.
Over time, the industry grew quite rapidly with about eighty-five percent of the implants done for cosmetic reasons and the rest for reconstruction following mastectomies. Approximately two million of the
implants were sold, and, although many companies were involved,
there were three companies with the principal responsibility for the
manufacture and sale of the products. By the early 1990s, women
with these implants began claiming that certain autoimmune and neurological conditions were caused by the silicone material in the implants, which leaked out of or "bled" through their shells. Numerous
other implantees were harmed not from disease, but because, when
the implants leaked, broke, or hardened, multiple surgeries were required to remove the implants and the silicone that had migrated
about their bodies.
After a small number of suits against the manufacturers of the
implants were litigated, often to quite large judgments, the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the federal cases in Bir47 There are a number of other very serious problems with the fairness of the CCR
settlement, but many of them do not flow from the problems of representation that are the
focus of this Article. The district court did recognize the problem of continuing supervl·
sion of the settlement by attorneys who represent individual clients (discussed infra Part
II.B.5 in the context of the silicone-gel breast-implant class action) and, albeit without
much discussion, required that class counsel discontinue their supervisory role for the
class-which included conducting an annual audit of the claims and appointing arbitrators
and medical panel members-if they were to continue to represent individual clients in the
claims procedure. See Georgine, 151 F.R.D. at 304 (finding potential conflict of interest
and noting that "the Court can and no doubt will exercise its power to appoint additional
class counsel who can fulfill the vital monitoring and supervisory responsibilities of class
counsel ... and who would not represent individual class members").
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mingham, Alabama. The Plaintiffs' Steering Committee-composed
of trial lawyers with pending breast-implant cases and operating
through a smaller negotiating committee-began settlement discussions with the defendants in an effort to achieve "global peace."
Eventually, a settlement was reached in a worldwide opt-out Rule
23(b)(3) class, with the defendants agreeing to put up approximately
$4.225 billion over a thirty-year period, approximately forty-five percent of which would be payable in the first three years after the settlement became final. Aside from the question of the reasonableness of
the total amount of the payments, an issue which exists in every settlement, the potential conflicts among differently situated class members
created a number of difficult problems in managing this settlement.
Although as of October 16, 1995, the global settlement had collapsed
because of insufficient funds and because Dow Corning sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the settlement illustrates a number of serious weaknesses in the current system.
The first condition of this settlement, which was essential to the
defendants, was that it could not simply resolve all pending cases, but
also had to establish a framework for resolving all future cases. The
parties agreed that the settlement would run at least thirty years and
that any class member could opt out, at least at the time of the settlement. In addition, in order to assure that the amount of litigation over
the payments to be received by eligible class members would be minimal, a grid was constructed for five diseases, with several variations
based on disease severity, along with a differential in payment based
upon age, so that younger women at the time of disease onset received
larger payments than older women. The principle of the grid was not
seriously in debate, although, as discussed later, the specifics raised a
number of questions.48
Various constraints determined the eventual structure of the settlement. On the one hand, the defendants were unwilling to create an
open-ended liability, such as agreeing to pay all injured women in accordance with the grid. On the other hand, the plaintiffs were unwilling to accept a fixed amount of money, since, when the argument was
raised, not even the total number of class members was known, let
alone the number of persons with current injuries in each disease category or the number of women who would develop qualifying diseases
in the future. Predictions were particularly difficult in this case because the science relating to whether diseases were caused by silicone
was still largely undeveloped, and there were great differences in
opinion as to causation and as to the likelihood that particular dis48

See infra Part II.B.l-5.
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eases would or would not recur at greater or lesser frequencies in the
future, especially after the implants were removed (a procedure which
would become more likely because the settlement provided for payments for explant surgery that existing medical insurance might not
cover).
Because of this uncertainty, it was agreed that, in addition to the
usual opt out at the time of notice of settlement, there would be a
second opt out. Under this procedure, the claims administrator first
would determine whether the amounts available for those persons
who had current injury claims that fell within the grid would be larger
than the amount provided in the initial payments made by the defendants. If so, unless the defendants made up the difference, which they
had the right but not the obligation to do, class members who were
not satisfied with the reduced amounts could opt out and maintain
their own lawsuits, which could include claims for punitive damages.
A similar right of opt out-except that the plaintiff could not seek
punitive damages-was provided for future claimants if, in any of the
thirty years in which future claims would be paid, there was insufficient money to pay those who were entitled to payment in that year
under the grid.49
1.

Allocation Problems

The first potential conflict arose because of questions about the
fairness of the allocation between current claimants and future claimants. In theory, each group is entitled to recover the same grid
amounts, and each has the right to opt out (although, as noted above,
the future claimants were denied the right to seek punitive damages if
they opted out-a separate, and significant, matter of contention).
But in the real world, there are very substantial differences.
First, and most significant, as in Georgine, there was no inflation
adjustment included in the settlement, despite the fact that the settlement class would receive payouts for thirty years. Class counsel had
49 The right of any member of the class to opt out was never seriously in dispute in this
case. Obviously, defendants wanted to keep that number as small as possible while at the
same time limiting the amount of money they would have to contribute to the settlement.
In theory, that would suggest that they would insist that the internal allocations be as fair
as possible, so that no one would opt out because of those issues. In reality, the defendants
did not press very hard on most of these issues, probably because they recognized that the
district court could not disapprove internal allocations without disapproving the entire set·
tlement, and because they figured, quite correctly as it turned out, that future claimants,
most of whom did not have lawyers, would not see the allocation problems, let alone be in
a position to make meaningful objections and appeal any adverse rulings. Thus, the possibility that defendants would have served as surrogates for future claimants does not appear
to have materialized.
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the right to make inflation adjustments, but only if there was money
left over that had not been used to pay eligible claims (i.e., only if
there was excess funding in any particular year-something no one
deemed likely) and only if approved by the court This inflation problem was both simpler and more complicated than its counterpart in
Georgine. The settlement values in the breast-implant case were not
described in terms of compensation ranges, but were specific amounts,
depending on the disease, its severity, and the age of the claimant at
onset. Thus, the loss due to inflation was very clear because the payment of the nominal grid amounts, for a claimant in year fifteen or
year thirty, would be far lower, in real terms, than a payment made in
year one.
However, there was one significant twist. As will be recalled, if,
in any future year, the nominal amounts on the settlement grid could
not be paid because there were too many eligible claimants, those
claimants could opt out and sue in the tort system, albeit without the
ability to collect punitive damages. But even for the purpose of this
future opt out, the amounts on the grid were not adjusted for inflation, so that the right to opt out in future years would, as a practical
matter, become less and less valuable. In the early years, claimants
would be able to opt out only if they were unable to recover what
class counsel believed to be fair compensation under the settlement
grid. In future years, however, claimants would be forced to stay in
the settlement if the nominal grid amounts could be paid, even though
those amounts might be only a small fraction, in real terms, of the grid
amounts for year one.
Further, recall that, before the future opt out took place, the defendants would be permitted to make up any shortfall, thereby
preventing opt outs. This would be done by supplying the difference
between what their agreed-upon obligation for that particular year
would be and what it would take to pay the grid amounts to all eligible
claimants for that year. In future years, because all that the defendants would have to do is make up the shortfall, which itself would not
be adjusted for inflation, the defendants would have the ability to
force class members to stay in the settlement and accept greatly diminished real recoveries, without any opportunity for the class members to obtain present-value recoveries in the tort system.
Second, the right to opt out in the future might be a wholly unrealistic one. Although now there are a large number of lawyers who
would be ready and willing to represent seriously injured women who
have diseases compensable under the grid, in fifteen or twenty years
there might be no one willing or with the experience to take on such
representation, particularly if there had been no lawsuits for many
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years because there was adequate funding at the start, and only in the
future did it become inadequate. Thus, the potentially illusory nature
of the right to opt out for future claimants created an additional problem with regard to the allocation of the $4.225 billion between current
and future claimants (which, as noted previously, put almost half of
the payments for grid diseases in the first three years).
What made the situation particularly difficult was that the Negotiating Committee and the Steering Committee principally represented
currently injured women, although some of them represented some
claimants who had breast implants but either did not yet have symptoms that were compensable under the grid or did not yet have symptoms at all. Most importantly, there was no one on the Negotiating
Committee who represented only women who did not yet have symptoms that would be compensable under the grid. What creates the
problem is that, under current law, the court has no right to reallocate
the agreed-upon total as between future and current claimants; its
only alternatives are to disapprove the entire settlement or approve it
with the unfair allocation.so
The third representational problem facing the plaintiffs' Negotiating Committee was which diseases should be included on the grid and
which should not. As noted above, at the time of the settlement the
science of silicone-gel breast implants was in a relatively early stage,
and there was conflicting data, at least with respect to some of the
diseases. In the face of this uncertainty, one thing was clear: The
more diseases on the grid, the smaller the payment that would go to
each claimant. On the other hand, if many diseases were not included,
there might be a substantial number of opt outs, which would entitle
the defendants to walk away from the settlement. But that possibility
was clouded because many victims, even those for whom there was
strong scientific evidence of causation, could not reasonably expect to
opt out, for a variety of reasons, including serious time-bar defenses,
particularly those concerning statutes of repose (which were waived in
settlement), the inability to identify the manufacturer of the implant
(also waived), and the insolvency of some of the lesser defendants
(also disregarded). Thus, for them, it was either the grid or nothing.
Further, the difficulty of providing meaningful notice and a meaningful right to opt out to those who might in the future contract a disease
not on the grid, while not as intractable a problem as in Georgine, was

so See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 727 (1986) (noting that Rule 23(e) does not
give court power, in advance of trial, to modify proposed consent decree and order Its
acceptance over either party's objection).
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certainly a very serious problem which magnified the potential hardship of excluding certain diseases.s1
After resolving the question of which diseases would go on the
grid, the Plaintiffs' Negotiating Committee and the defendants further
divided the payments by age at onset, in five-year segments, and then
added levels of injury within each disease category. The number of
grid slots thereby reached forty, and for each box on the grid a dollar
amount was assigned. The general theory of the numbers is discernable: the earlier the onset and the more severe the symptoms, the
greater the compensation. The numbers, after payment of attorneys'
fees and expenses, range from $105,000 to $1.2 million. Yet there is
no explanation of how the numbers or various progressions were derived. To be sure, no precise mathematical model could be employed-especially because there was so little verdict and settlement
history in breast-implant cases-but the wide variations in numbers
suggested a need for some kind of assurance of fairness within the
class and, indeed, between the claimants who were entitled to recover.
To further complicate the matter, approximately fifty percent of
the implants were sold abroad. Assuming that the physical injuries of
U.S. and foreign women were substantially the same, that did not
mean that identically situated persons here and abroad should recover
the same amount of money. No one disputed that many foreign legal
systems provide either very little likelihood of recovery or much more
modest awards when recovery is permitted. Moreover, there was a
significant difference of opinion as to whether foreign claimants could
have sued in the United States, and, even if a forum could be held in
the United States, whether awards would be less generous for nonU.S. citizens because of choice-of-law determinations.
As part of the settlement negotiations, the specific situation of
the foreign claimants had to be resolved. The process was complicated by the fact that no member of the Negotiating Committee represented any, or at least more than a very small number of, foreign
claimants. Even on the full sixteen-person Steering Committee, there
were only one or two lawyers who represented a substantial number
Sl It could be argued that the waivers of defenses also created conflicts because they
favored some class members over others. A partial answer to that charge would focus on
the reasons for the waivers-eliminating very substantial costs in the claims process by
simplifying the liability inquiry-a gain that would redound to the benefit of the entire
class. But there was also no reason to believe that the negotiators favored those who
needed waivers because there was no reason to believe that their clients were predominately, let alone entirely, in that category. That, however, is precisely the situation for the
negotiators and the future claimants and hence explains why one set of distinctions can
properly be assumed to be fair, while the other presumptively raises questions of unequal
treatment
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of foreign victims. Whether that representational void substantially
affected the outcome of the negotiations can only be surmised, but the
fact remains that, when the settlement was submitted to the court, the
solution to the foreign-claimants problem was that there was a cap on
the total amount of money that could be paid to foreign victims equal
to three percent of the total settlement. It is undisputed that that percentage had no specific rationale to support it, let alone that it constituted a measured judgment concerning the allocation of total likely
recovery as between the foreign and U.S. residents. Rather, it appears
to be a number that the Steering Committee believed would not be so
great as to cause domestic claimants to object, and would be sufficiently large to encourage at least some foreign claimants to stay in. 52
While dealing with foreign claimants is difficult, issues of internal
allocation become even more complicated as to future claimants.
First, the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee insisted on including a provision which would permit additional diseases to be added to the grid,
after a thorough scientific review and with court approval. However,
there was no provision allowing diseases to be removed, regardless of
how conclusive the scientific evidence was that the particular disease
was unrelated to silicone-gel breast implants. The effect of this oneway street is to create a risk that future claimants will have to share
their funds with a larger group, but with no possibility of the group
ever becoming smaller, even if those whose diseases were removed
from the grid were given the right to opt out. .
52 The approach taken in the breast-implant litigation is rather different from that
taken in the heart-valve settlement. With respect to the modest payments to resolve the
claims of current nonphysical injuries resulting from defective heart valves, all class mem·
bers-foreign and U.S.-were entitled to the same payment. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143
F.R.D. 141, 149 (S.D. Ohio 1992). The same was true for reoperation benefits for the
explant of high-risk valves and other medical benefits under the settlement. Id.
The only distinction drawn between U.S. and non-U.S. class members was for valve
fractures, a tragic event which results in death two-thirds of the time and serious injuries In
most of the other cases. There, if U.S. class members' valves fractured, they automatically
were entitled to between $500,000 and $2 million depending on their age, number of de·
pendents, lost wages, and other factors, but could opt for binding arbitration or the tort
system. For foreign claimants, in addition to the same arbitration and tort options, the
settlement guaranteed minimum recoveries-$200,000 in common-law and other devel·
oped countries and $50,000 in the developing world-and appointed a Foreign Fracture
Panel of foreign law experts to canvass tort settlements in the various countries of the
world and to set compensation rates in four groupings of countries, subject to court np·
proval. ld. at 150. There was no overall percentage cap for foreign claimants so that, at
least in theory, the difference in recovery for foreign and domestic claimants was roughly
based on differences in tort systems. Although the breast-implant settlement also contem·
plated a separate foreign grid, the three percent cap would prevent, as a practical matter,
achieving what was achieved in the heart-valve case, unless most foreign claimants opted
out.
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Second, those women whose current diseases were not on the
grid at the time of the settlement could at least make an informed
choice about whether they wanted to opt out and take their chances in
court. They might have difficulty proving their cases, but it was better
than nothing since the grid would absolutely preclude them, no matter
how strong the scientific evidence concerning their diseases was at
that time. Their only reason to stay in, aside from some modest medical payments and the possibility of a small payment for pain and suffering for nongrid diseases, was that they might become very unlucky
and develop a disease that was on the grid, and be compensated in
that way.
Two diseases fell prominently into this noncompensatory category: cancer allegedly caused by silicone gel, and breast cancer that
was masked from effective mammography by the presence of an implant. There were reasons given for not including these two diseases
on the grid, some having to do \vith the difficulty of showing a causal
connection and others having to do with the size of the payments that
an inclusion of that disease would require from the available settlement fund. As to cancer alleged to be caused by silicone gel, at present there is not a great deal of evidence that such a causal connection
exists.53 Thus, although it was possible that cancer might be added to
the grid in the future, that seemed highly unlikely since cancer, particularly breast cancer, is so \videspread that, in a settlement where causation is completely eliminated, if cancer were placed on the grid, it
would result in many class members being compensated even where
there was no connection between cancer and the implant.
With respect to the breast-cancer masking issue, it seems certain
that the Committee's decision not to include this disease on the grid is
final, since there is already good evidence that breast-cancer masking
is a serious problem with the implants.54 The problem of possible
overcompensation, given the "no causation" nature of this settlement,
could have been dealt with to some degree by requiring medical evidence of breast cancer, one or more negative mammograms, and a
doctor's statement that, in fact, the woman had already contracted
breast cancer or a precancerous condition that otherwise would have
53 However, the Food and Drug Administration believed that there \'t'aS enough evidence of a possible connection that, in 1991, the agency required manufacturers to provide
data on cancer causation in their applications for any future approval of the devices. 56
Fed. Reg. 14,620, 14,624 (1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 878) ("After review of all
available information, the agency continues to believe that carcinogenicity is a potential
risk that must be assessed ....").
54 Affidavit of Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., submitted by Public Citizen as amicus curiae
(June 14, 1994), In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-1000-S,
1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept 1, 1994).
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been visible on a mammogram at the time of the negative mammogram.55 Since breast-cancer masking will never be compensated
under the present settlement, we think it clear that masking claims
should not have been precluded by the settlement; that is, class members-whether or not they opt out-should be free to pursue such
claims in court. At the very least, a class member should have the
right to pursue these claims through a subsequent opt out if she contracts breast cancer.
In sum, for the current claimants, i.e., those with cancer thought
to be caused by silicone or masked by the implant, the choice to opt
out was not an easy one, but at least the options were clear. On the
other hand, for those women who did not have any current symptoms
(cancer or otherwise), the exclusion of those diseases from the grid
placed them in a situation where, if they stayed in and contracted cancer, they could no longer elect to opt out, and the grid would not pay
for their illnesses. Of course, the only rationale that could lead a future claimant to opt out now would be if she believed that she would
not get a disease on the grid, but might get a disease that was not on
the grid, and wanted to guard against that possibility. Surely, no one
would consider the right to opt out in that situation meaningful or the
choice to get out a rational one, yet that is, in effect, the choice that
future claimants were given when they were given the right to opt out.
2.

Problems of Fee Distribution

In addition to these questions of internal allocations among
claimants, there is a very important issue relating to attorneys' fees
that is unique in this type of litigation and quite different from the
. ordinary fee problems that exist in every class action. The fact that
this class action is one of the largest on record, involving large numbers of attorneys, many of whom claim to have created some portion
of the common fund, would make the fee determination difficult
under any circumstances. Moreover, if fees for creating the fund are
sought as a percentage of the $4.225 billion recovery, which appears

55 Another complication is that the negative mammogram might well have been the
fault of the mammographer, since the quality of mammography varies widely from practl·
tioner to practitioner. Cf. Gerald K. Kuester & Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., HRG Report on
Screening Mammography and Ranking of Eleven Metro Washington Area Facilities (Pub·
lic Citizen Health Research Group, Washington, D.C.), July 1991, at 17-26 (ranking quality
of mammographers in Washington, D.C. area). See generally Mammography Quality
Standards Act, 21 C.F.R. § 900 (1995) (accreditation and quality standards for mam·
mography facilities).
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required by Eleventh Circuit precedent,s6 a change up or down of
even one-tenth of one percent amounts to $4,225,000, making very
small percentage adjustments very significant.
The matter becomes much more difficult because there are not
only the fees of class counsel to consider, but also fees claimed by
attorneys for individual members of the class. The latter does not
arise in most class actions as victims are not usually individually represented, generally because the amounts of money to be received are so
small or because demonstrating the entitlement to the funds does not
require a lawyer's assistance. Here, by contrast, the grid amounts
originally ranged from $200,000 to $2 million (before attorneys' fees).
Since most of the women who are current claimants are represented
by counsel, the question to be faced is how to assure reasonable, but
not excessive, compensation for representation of individual clients.
Several factors complicate the calculation of reasonable fees.
First, many personal injury lawyers do not maintain time records, and
thus any effort to award fees on a time basis for individual cases involving current injuries, particularly those that arose before the multidistrict litigation (MDL) transfer order, would have met with
massive resistance and perhaps created serious unfairness, if not a
large number of opt outs. Second, there were substantial differences
in the risks assumed for representation, depending on when the lawyer took on the case. Many class members had their own lawsuits
filed several years before the MDL case was even opened, while
others signed up clients either when the settlement was preliminarily
announced in September 1993, or at various times thereafter, including in early March 1994, when the settlement was tentatively
presented to the court for approval. Third, much of the work that was
done prior to or during the MDL, even by individual lawyers, was not
applicable just to a single case, but helped all of the clients involved.
Thus, reviewing depositions, analyzing medical testimony, and attending court hearings, to name just a few, would appear to be useful to all
of the lawyers' clients, whether in the class or outside of it.57
56 See Camden I Condominium Ass'n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 775 (11th Cir. 1991)
(vacating district court's method of calculating attorneys' fees and ordering fees based on
percentage of common fund award).
57 Many of the lawyers for the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee did extremely valuable
work on medical and other liability issues that is available to other plaintiffs and their
lawyers. For instance, several million documents are available at low cost on CD-ROM,
which saves other lawyers and their clients hundreds, if not thousands, of hours in discovery, not to mention storage space and out-of-pocket costs associated with obtaining the
information. Several years prior to the MDL, Public Citizen's Health Research Group-a
part of Public Citizen, where the authors are employed-established a clearinghouse of
breast-implant documents, which were made available to plaintiffs' lawyers at a modest
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Some law firms represent several thousand claimants, while other
firms represent only a handful. Furthermore, some counsel who rep·
resent individual women have done a substantial amount of work for
them, even though their injuries do not show up on the grid, although
they may be entitled to some modest payments from the other ancillary funds created under the settlement. Should these lawyers receive
nothing for their work on those cases, on the theory that that is what
contingency litigation is about, or is there some other principle that
ought to apply? The problem is further complicated because there are
both large class fees and large fees based on individual contracts with
victims, and because some of the same lawyers did both class and individual work, some did only one, and some only the other.
Judge Pointer took a number of promising steps in an effort to
solve these problems, but, given the current status of the settlement, it
is impossible to evaluate how successful they would have been. First,
he modified the original grid, and some of the other payment funds, to
set aside a maximum amount for all attorneys' fees and administrative
expenses equal to approximately twenty-four percent of the total
amount of the settlement. As a result, the grid amounts were net of
any claim for attorneys' fees and costs and were represented to be
such in the class notice. Judge Pointer's assertion of jurisdiction over
the fees of individual counsel, as well as class counsel, was appropriate
to protect against overreaching, and his creation of a twenty-four percent maximum was a step in the right direction, although there is no
basis for determining at this time whether that figure was too generous to counsel or about right.ss
cost, and held meetings of plaintiffs' lawyers to provide updates on medical developments.
The Health Research Group had done the same with respect to the heart valve at issue in
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992), as well as for several other prob·
!em drugs and medical devices.
ss This seems to us to be a far better approach than what occurred in Georgine, where
the Settlement Agreement itself stated that fees would not exceed 25% (with the fees in a
very small number of high-end "extraordinary" claims limited to between 20% and 25%),
Georgine SOS, supra note 25, at 93, but gave the district court no ability to rein in excessive fees in individual cases. In some cases-for instance, where exposure to CCR prod·
ucts is in serious dispute-substantial work may be necessary, whereas in other situations,
a 25% fee will be excessive. For instance, in many mesothelioma cases, submitting medical
records and filling out the claim fonn will be all that is necessary, allowing the attorney to
pocket 25% of the $20,000 to $200,000 payment range for very little work. In our view,lt is
no answer that even higher percentage fees are charged in the tort system. First, for some
asbestos-related diseases where medical causation is a serious issue in the tort system, that
issue was waived in Georgine. Second, overreaching in the tort system is no reason for the
court not to exercise its fiduciary responsibilities under Rule 23(e).
In the heart-valve litigation, neither the court nor the settlement agreement addressed
the issue of fees for individual claims. The settlement agreement provided that class mem·
hers who suffered valve fractures were entitled, upon submission of proof that the fracture
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Judge Pointer also established a committee of attorneys, plus an
activist from one of the victims' rights groups, to prepare recommendations on how to handle attorneys'-fees matters. As part of its work,
this committee had planned to survey attorneys for the class and for
individual class members as to the nature of the work performed, the
types of cases they have, their fee arrangements, and the like. At least
temporarily, the committee's efforts to gather information have been
put on the back burner, but perhaps only until other issues can be
resolved. Whether it will be possible to go ahead without this information, or whether the information will be obtained at a later date, is
yet to be determined. At this stage, no concrete solutions to these
difficult fee issues have been proposed, let alone resolved.

3.

Problems of Applicable Law

Another issue that surfaced at the fairness hearing points out the
inherent difficulty in trying to resolve cases like this on a nationwide
basis. During the course of settlement negotiations, it was no secret to
either side that the applicable law was not uniform throughout the
United States and that, in the tort system, some victims might receive
more money than others would because of which law was applicable.
On the other hand, there was very little experience in litigated breastimplant cases at the time the settlement was struck, and it would have
been difficult to craft meaningful distinctions among class members on
the basis of differences in applicable law, let alone to assign monetary
values to those distinctions. The settlement ultimately reached did not
make any such distinctions (other than for foreign claimants), and that
decision seems sensible, not only because there was not much data
upon which to make that decision, but because any other outcome
would have produced considerable complexity with no clear countervailing benefit.59
occurred, to immediate payment of compensation (ranging from $500,000 to S2 million for
U.S. claimants, depending upon number of dependents, lost wages, etc.). See supra note
52. In our view, the settlement agreement should have made clear that no percentage fees
may be charged against this award, since no contingency exists, and that class counsel wiU
represent class members at no charge to them (although class counsel would be entitled to
a small fee for this service as part of his overall fee from the common fund}. If the class
members desire separate representation to secure payment under the settlement, they are
free to obtain it, but even there the lawyer should be permitted to charge only a reasonable
hourly fee. Because no controls of this type are in place, we are concerned that serious
overcharging may occur.
59 In Georgine, one of the factors that may be taken into account in determining the
amount of the award to each eligible claimant within the settlement ranges is the location
of the forum in which a suit could have been maintained by a class member, a position that
seems appropriate in light of CCR's long settlement history and supporting data for every
jurisdiction. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.RD. 246, 267-77 (E.D. Pa. 1994},
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But notions of uniformity appear to have been abandoned when
various insurance companies raised the issue of subrogation in connection with the settlement. These companies claimed that, under the
applicable law, the amounts that the class members would receive
under the grid would be, in part, compensation for medical expenses
(although there is no internal designation of what the payments were
for or how they were calculated). According to the insurers, at least
some portion ought to be paid to them since they had paid, and would
be called upon to pay, various class members' medical expenses over
the years. The insurers did not identify specific women, let alone specific amounts for which insurance payments had been made, but,
rather like the settlement itself, treated the matter on a classwide basis
and asked that the court determine that they were entitled to some
subrogation.
One of the responses made by class counsel was that the laws of
each of the states on subrogation were quite different and that there
was no basis for the insurance companies, subsequently joined by the
federal government on behalf of medicare, medicaid, and other programs, and by some states raising similar claims, to be entitled to any
money from the settlement fund. Instead, according to class counsel,
the insurance companies and governments should raise any claims in
individual actions in the location where their insureds reside.
Aside from the inconsistency of both defending and attacking nationwide treatment for the class, class counsel's decision to oppose the
insurers on that ground raises serious issues of fairness among the
class members. While class members with potentially small amounts
owed to insurers would no doubt be happy to keep every penny that
the grid would allow them, on the theory that, as a practical matter,
the insurance companies would leave them alone, that might not be
true for a woman whose insurance company had paid $100,000 on her
behalf and then writes her after the settlement check arrives, demanding payment and/or threatening to cut off future benefits. For that
person, dealing with the issue as part of the settlement, particularly if
there were an opportunity to resolve the issue for substantially less
than the full amount of payments, would seem quite attractive and yet
was foreclosed by a decision of class counsel. Furthermore, ignoring
vacated and remanded, Nos. 94-1925 et al., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11191 (3d Cir. May 10,
1996).
Although, as noted, we believe the breast-implant settlement did not err in avoiding
distinctions based on applicable law, where there are clear differences that would have a
substantial effect on the relief to be accorded certain class members in a nationwide class
action, the court is required, in our view, to consider those differences before approving
the settlement. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
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the subrogation issue at settlement will almost surely make life more
difficult for women who do not have lawyers and thus must deal with
the insurance companies on their own at some time in the future. At
the very least, class counsel's strategy raises substantial issues about
adequacy of representation because of the different situations of the
various members of the class.6o
4.

Problems of Tzming of Payments

Another problem arises from the portion of the agreement which
makes the defendants' payments keyed to the date when the approval
of the settlement is final and no longer subject to appeal. Under the
settlement, that date is the trigger date for the first substantial payment for compensation to class members and, equally important, each
subsequent annual payment is keyed to the original payment date.
Thus, the further in the future that first payment is made, the further
will be each payment down the line. This is obviously in the financial
interest of the defendants, but what makes it so inappropriate is that it
acts as a hammer to be used against class members who ask for additional time to prepare for the settlement hearing, or to consider appealing from adverse rulings on the approval of the merits of the
settlement.
Of course, defendants should be entitled to insist that no money
be paid out under the settlement until there is no further chance for
appeal, but that does not mean that courts should permit settlements
without any accrual of interest from the time that the settlement has
been agreed upon, or some other fixed date, until the first payment is
due. There can be little doubt, based upon our experience in cases of
this kind, that the reason that plaintiffs' counsel agreed to this condition is because they are more interested in the settlement being approved than they are in fairness to all class members.
5. Problems of Administering the Settlement

A final area where issues of fairness and representation persist
involves the continuing administration of the settlement after all appeals are rendered and the money becomes payable. In a case like
60 Avoidance of the subrogation issue, at least for now, is also somewhat at odds with
the way in which the court dealt with the fees issue. As noted earlier, originally the grid
amounts were higher, with the expectation that fees would be deducted from that amounl
However, the court, acting on its own, reduced the grid amounts by 25% across the board,
allowing the class to be notified that the grid amounts were net recoveries (subject only to
the potential for a ratcheting down and further opt out). If, however, there are valid subrogation claims, which there surely are in some cases, then the grid amounts are not necessarily net recoveries.
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this, there inevitably will be questions, aside from the addition or subtraction of compensable diseases, that must be decided. It obviously
makes sense to have persons familiar with the process participate in
an advisory role to the court as long as the claims process is ongoing.
But a potential conflict of interest arises if those members of the
ongoing Steering Committee continue to have clients of their own
who are seeking money from the fund. Thus, for example, if the question is whether a disease should be added, can lawyers whose clients
have that disease fairly pass on that request? And can they possibly
fairly represent people who would like to have a disease added when
it is in the interest of their clients not to have further additions to the
grid? This and other questions, such as those relating to ongoing matters involving attorneys' fees, should be resolved only by lawyers who
can adequately represent all of the class members, without any favoritism towards those whom they also represent in an individual
capacity.
C.

The GM-Truck Class Action

This national class action grew out of a series of statewide and
regional class actions that were transferred to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in late
February 1993.61 Plaintiffs were owners of General Motors (GM)
trucks that were prone to explosion in side-impact collisions because
the gas tank was mounted outside the frame of the vehicle. Plaintiffs
claimed economic damages for the alleged diminished value of their
vehicles and argued that GM should repair the vehicles or pay to correct the alleged safety defect. The settlement was much less complex
than those in the asbestos and breast-implant cases, as the class included only currently injured people, and it did not involve the settlement of personal-injury cases, which were specifically excluded from
the settlement.62 However, this case provides a good example of a
relatively recent settlement class action phenomenon, in which Rule
61 The MDL settlement, which comprised truck owners in every state but Texas, was
approved by the district court, but was reversed and remanded by the Third Circuit. In re
General Motors Corp. Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 846 F. Supp. 330 (B.D.
Pa. 1993), rev'd, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995). An identical
settlement, applicable only to Texans, was approved by a state trial court in Thxas, but
reversed by the Texas Court of Appeals. Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422
(Tex. Ct. App. 1994). The Texas Supreme Court recently affirmed the Texas Court of Appeals decision, General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, No. 94-0777, 1996 WL 51180 (Tex. Feb. 9,
1996), principally on the grounds that there was no notice to class members of the amount
of attorneys' fees. Id. at *8. The Texas Supreme Court remanded the case to take up
several other issues on which the Court provided guidance. Id. at *9-*12.
62 In re General Motors, 846 F. Supp. at 333.
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23(b)(3) cases settle for items other than cash-particularly coupons
for the purchase of additional products made by the defendantthereby raising the question whether large segments of the class are
releasing their claims without obtaining any value.
The GM-truck case settled shortly after it was sent to Philadel. phia, with the defendant agreeing to class certification, but only for
the purposes of settlement and specifically contending that the class
could not be certified for litigation, as in the asbestos and breastimplant cases. The settlement provided that each class member could,
upon request, receive a $1000 certificate to purchase another GM
truck or van within a fifteen-month period.63 Alternatively, the class
member, after obtaining the $1000 certificate, could trade it in for a
$500 certificate, for use during the same redemption period, if the
class member designated, in a notarized statement, a specific third
party to be named on the certificate. The $500 certificate could be
used only by the third party named on it to purchase a full-sized GM
truck, but not the less expensive trucks or vans for which the $1000
certificate could be used, and came with a host of other restrictions,
including that the ubiquitous GM rebates and financing incentivesalmost all of which exceeded $500-could not be used in tandem with
the certificate.64
63 The class member would not be sent the $1000 certificate, but rather would have to
fill out a form and send it to GM which then would send the certificate to the class member. Objectors' marketing experts opined that this procedure would greatly diminish the
number of class members who would ultimately redeem certificates, and would effectively
reduce the redemption period from the nominal15-month period to about one year. Declaration of Jack Gillis '110, Joint App. at 1888, In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 767 (3d Cir.) (No. 94-1207), cert. denied,116 S. Ct. 88
{1995).
In addition to the representation problems discussed in the text, the GM settlement
also presents the question of whether it is appropriate, under any circumstance, for courts
to approve settlements in which the relief granted is linked to the purchase of the defendant's product, and which thus appear to involve the court in marketing that product. Cf.
Bloyed, 881 S.W.2d at 431 (rejecting Texas GM settlement, among other reasons, on
ground that defendant would receive marketing windfall and would suffer no detriment);
In re General Motors, 55 F .3d at 808 (agreeing with Texas appellate court's characterization
of settlement in Bloyed).
64 Supplemental Declaration of Jack Gillis 'I 2, Joint App. at 1895-97, In re General
Motors (No. 94-1207); see In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 809 (GM's rebates can "completely erode[ ]" value of certificate, leaving class member "no better off than the general
public"). The Certificate Clearing Corporation-a national clearinghouse that creates secondary markets for truly transferable certificates and has handled certificates in several
other national class actions-refused to handle the certificates on the ground that the encumbrances to transfer were so great that a secondary market could not be created. Affi·
davit of Stephen Schoenfeld, Joint App. at 1931-36, In re General Motors (No. 94-1207);
see In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 809 ("[T]he one-time transfer restriction also precludes the development of a market-making clearing house mechanism."); In Camera, 16
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This settlement raised a serious representational problem because the relief obtained in the settlement was not sought in the complaint and could not have been obtained if the case had been litigated
to judgment. Thus, because the settlement did not provide the relief
ordinarily granted in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action-money damages,
which are of equal value to all class members-it raises the question
whether the relief which is granted will be available, as a practical
matter, to all, or even most, members of the class.
As it turned out, according to the marketing expert hired by class
counsel, because of the high cost of purchasing a vehicle, the short
redemption period, and the restrictions on transfer, more than half of
the class would obtain no value at all from the settlement.6S Importantly, the fact that less than half of the class would obtain anything
from the settlement bore no relation to the strength or weakness of
that class member's claim and, as the Third Circuit pointed out, was a
by-product of the fact that the settlement disadvantaged poorer members of the class who could not afford to purchase a new vehicle,66
By contrast, in some settlements, class members are excluded
from the class definition because their claims are very weak or nonexistent.67 Thus, in Georgine, class members whose claims were timebarred at the time of the filing of the class action complaint will not
recover under the settlement. 68 And, in both Georgine and the
Class Action Rep. 369,485 (1993) ("Without such market-makers, most potential coupons
sellers will have no buyers.").
65 The expert concluded, based on a marketing survey he had conducted of current
GM-truck owners, that 46% to 49% of the class members would gain some value from the
certificate, In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 807, either by using it themselves or by trans·
ferring it to others, a conclusion adopted by the district court, but severely questioned by
the Third Circuit. See id. at 807-10. Shortly after the settling parties' expert provided his
opinion to the district court, one part of his opinion-that 13% to 16% of the class would
transfer the coupon to relatives who would, in tum, use the coupon-proved seriously In
error. The settlement agreement required class members to state, by a certain date, that
they wanted to transfer the certificate to relatives outside of their households, and only
0.8% of the class did so. Of course, it is possible that some class members would want to
make intrahousehold transfers to family members. However, on the generous assumption
that the 0.8% figure would double because of intrahousehold transfers, objectors' market·
ing experts estimated conservatively that the original estimate was at least 800% to 900%
overstated, a conclusion that the settling parties did not counter. See Supplemental Decla·
ration of Jack Gillis 1'1 6-7, Joint App. at 1898-99, In re General Motors (No. 94-1207).
66 In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 808.
67 See, e.g., Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 661 F. Supp. 1368, 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1987),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 860 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 810 (1989) (in settlement providing payment of unreimbursed transmission repair
costs, vehicle owners whose first transmission repair was 50,000 miles after first use were
excluded from class, presumably on ground that transmission failure after that point could
not be fairly attributed to defendant's conduct).
68 Georgine SOS, supra note 25, at 49-50.
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breast-implant case, class members who do not contract compensable
illnesses in the future, may not, of course, receive awards under those
settlements' disease compensation programs. As indicated previously,
we have grave reservations, especially in Georgine, about the exclusion of certain illnesses from compensation, but our point, for present
purposes, is that the Georgine and the breast-implant settlements profess to condition the relief and the amount thereof on the satisfaction
of purportedly objective criteria. In the GM case, however, the settlement assumed that all class members were injured equally, but paid a
benefit that cannot be shared equally, and indeed one which most
class members could not partake in at all. It is as if the settlement
provided monetary relief of, say, $500 to half the class, and then
picked the "deserving" class members by the turn of a roulette wheel,
or, more accurately, by the toss of a set of dice loaded against poorer
class members.
There is one other aspect of the GM settlement that raises a serious representational problem. About forty percent of the vehicles
were the property of fleet owners, i.e., businesses and particularly governments that owned many trucks. Numerous state, city, and county
govermrients, including Pennsylvania, New York, and New York City,
objected to the settlement, making essentially two arguments.69 First,
several governmental units, including New York, which owned more
than 1200 GM trucks, argued that they stood to get nothing from the
settlement because, under competitive bidding requirements, they
would not be able to use the certificates at all, making cash the only
appropriate remedy. The district court acknowledged this argument
and did not counter it, noting only that, if the governmental objectors'
lawyers were clever, they ought to be able to figure a way around the
competitive bidding rules.1o
Second, some governments argued that the short redemption period particularly prejudiced them because they could not possibly use
a reasonable number of their certificates during that time period.
They argued that they had purchased large fleets of trucks and, thus,
whatever injury had been suffered by the class should be calculated in
rough proportion to the number of trucks owned. This argument had
some force since it seemed clear that, had the settlement been for
cash, say $200 in cash instead of a $1000 certificate, the governmental
69 Several governments did, however, appear as amici in the Third Circuit urging approval of the settlement
70 In re General Motors Corp. Pickup Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 846 F. Supp. 330,
340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("The court is confident that ingenious counsel will be able to structure bidding requirements so that the governmental entities can take full advantage of the
certificates."), rev'd, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct 88 {1995).
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units would have received $200 for each vehicle that they owned.
Here, the settling parties agreed that, since the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation owned 1700 GM trucks, it had the right to
request 1700 certificates, but there was little question that the state
would not be able to purchase a significant number of vehicles over
the redemption period.n
In remanding the case to the district court for further consideration, the Third Circuit apparently agreed with the governmental objectors on both scores. First, it stated that the problem of using the
coupons in governmental competitive bidding processes could well
make the coupons useless to some public agencies and that the district
court's dismissal of this argument was "far too cavalier." 72 Second,
the court of appeals noted that the short redemption period and the
barriers to transfer of the coupon were particularly harsh on the fleet
owners who, by virtue of the large number of vehicles owned, had the
strongest claims.73

71 The district court rejected this argument on the ground that the governments were
no different than individual class members who could not afford a new truck, maintaining
that the fleet owners could try to sell the $500 certificates to third parties under the settlement's certificate transfer procedures. Id.
72 In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 808-09 (citing, e.g., The Louisiana Public Bid Lnw,
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38:2212(A)(1){a) (West 1989)).
73 Id. at 800-01, 809 {discussing inadequacy of representation for fleet owners and individual owners within class). While the Third Circuit's decision is heartening, it is unclear
whether it will be adopted elsewhere. The authors are currently involved in opposing another nationwide vehicle class action involving 1984-1986 Ford Mustang convertibles in
which the plaintiffs allege that defectively designed side door panels cause the vehicles to
suffer from water leakage into the passenger compartment, excessive wind noise, chipping
paint, and a risk of personal injuries in certain collisions. Moreover, the settlement did not
propose to fix the vehicles even though Ford had produced a repair kit that it first installed
on the 1987 model and which Ford dealers will install for $600 on the 1984-1986 models.
Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement at 1-2 (Jan. 20, 1995), Dale v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 661492 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County); cf.In re General Motors, 55 F.3d at 811
(existence of viable repair contested). The case was resolved for a $400 nontransferable
coupon, good for only one year, toward the purchase of a new Ford. The trial court approved the settlement over objections similar to those made in In re General Motors. Dale
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 661492 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County Apr. 14, 1995). An appeal
is pending. Dale v. Ford Motor Co., No. 001795 (Cal. Ct. App. filed June 13, 1995). See
generally Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons-Millions for Class-Action Lawyers, Scrip for
Plaintiffs, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1995, at Dl, D5 (quoting attorneys for Chrysler Corporation to effect that coupon settlements involve "soft money" that does not negatively affect
"the bottom line," and describing Chrysler settlement involving $400 nontransferable coupon toward purchase of new vehicle in which only about one percent of class redeemed
coupon); Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1995, at H2 {describing tentative settlement involving $1.275
billion in coupons, good toward purchase of new or used Toyota, to settle class action
claiming that Toyota dealers overcharged customers).
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rn
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

A.
1.

Suggested Procedures To Lessen Representation Problems

Separate Representation for Future and Other Class Members

In order to avoid some of the representational problems currently
faced by future class members, we believe that the Rules should be
amended to make clear that the original counsel who brought the action may not ordinarily represent both presently injured and yet-tobe-injured class members. Counsel involved in negotiating a class action settlement should be required to report to the court as soon as
they anticipate the possibility of a settlement that contemplates binding future class·members. At that point, the court should appoint separate counsel to represent future class members. That person or
persons should be someone who represents no presently injured
claimants.
It might be argued that this Rule would bar the very persons
competent to represent the future clients-those with experience representing individuals who have been injured by the product. However, we believe that this concern is overblown. Frrst, the principal
objective would be to appoint someone who is experienced both in
class actions and in personal-injury litigation, and who has the breadth
and determination to research the relevant factual issues. In
Georgine, after class counsel was found by the district court to be laboring under a potential conflict by representing both the class and
individual claimants in the ongoing administration of the approved
settlement, class counsel moved the court to appoint as representative
of the class an experienced personal-injury lawyer who was not presently involved in asbestos litigation, and thus who had no pending
cases against the CCR defendants. Class counsel represented to the
court that this new counsel was up to the task of monitoring the complex Georgine claims procedure. We do not doubt counsel's assertion
in that regard, and assume that this same person could have represented the future class members during the negotiation process.
Second, nothing would prevent separate counsel from hiring consultants and medical experts for the purpose of determining suitable
relief for future class members.74 In short, we believe that the courts
should be able to find many suitable unconfiicted attorneys to represent a "futures" class.
74 Cf. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (objectors' concern
that class counsel had no experience in heart-valve cases was alleviated by class counsel's
retention of additional counsel with such experience).
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Moreover, while perfection may not be obtainable, appointment
of a "futures" representative who is not representing presently injured
clients, even if he or she is lacking experience in some respects, is far
preferable to one all-purpose class counsel who simply cannot be all
things to all people. As noted earlier, the "futures" classes in
Georgine and the breast-implant case should have had attorneys to
argue that some of the money should be set aside to pay for inflation,75 hardly an argument that would require the skills of a trial lawyer intimately familiar with medical issues in the asbestos or breastimplant cases.
As we discuss below, the court should also undertake a substantive review to protect the future class.76 However, the appointment of
counsel dedicated to representing future class members will, in itself,
go a long way to correcting the worst abuses. Such counsel would not,
as occurred in the breast-implant case, have agreed to a thirty-year
settlement without some type of built-in inflation factor. Similarly, a
"futures" representative would take a very different view on notice
issues-especially in environmental toxin cases where notice to "futures" is by its nature futile in some circumstances-than would counsel who represent presently injured clients who, by definition, have
notice, if not of the action, at least of their injUries and their exposure
to the product. In addition, counsel for future class members might
insist on a viable back-end opt out, such as that available in the heartvalve settlement, where future class members are given an opportunity, if their valves fracture, to choose among fixed payments, binding
arbitration, or the tort system.77 Moreover, such counsel might argue
that certain future class members, who are particularly susceptible to
problems of notice, such as mesothelioma victims whose illnesses can
arise based on brief exposures in the distant past, are entitled to backend and other rights that other future class members would not
have.78
The need for appointment of separate representatives at an early
point in the process is not limited to the problem of future class members, although that situation is perhaps the most obvious. As soon as
plaintiffs' counsel anticipate the possibility of a settlement that may
See supra text accompanying notes 33-42.
See infra text accompanying notes 122-27.
77 See Bowling, 143 F.R.D. at 150 (summarizing rights retained by class members under
settlement).
78 There are, of course, situations where one "futures" representative might not be suf·
ficient. If, as may be the case with mesothelioma claimants, circumstances vary dramntl·
cally among future class members, a "futures" representative may be necessary for each
"futures" subgroup.
75

76
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adversely affect distinct subgroups in the class, they should inform the
court, which would then appoint separate representatives for such
subgroups. Perhaps the clearest example other than that of the "futures" is that of the foreign claimants in the breast-implant case,
whose interest in the overall fund was capped at three percent. but
who had no representation on the Negotiating Committee, which was
comprised of lawyers who represented domestic claimants. Similarly,
in Georgine, since class counsel was aware that class members suffering from pleural disease would be treated differently than historically
had been the case, having themselves just settled hundreds, if not
thousands, of pleural cases for cash prior to the settlement.79 separate
representation for the pleural claimants would appear to have been
necessary.
The need for a separate class representative-particularly in
cases involving future claims-highlights one of the problems with
class actions that are settled prior to the filing of the complaint. As
was the case in both Georgine and Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp. ,80 an
asbestos settlement class action for which certification was sought
under the non-opt-out provisions of Rule 23(b)(l)(B),B1 one set of
plaintiffs' counsel, purporting to represent all presently injured class
members and all future class members, agreed to a settlement and
then immediately thereafter submitted the settlement for the court's
approval upon the filing of the complaint. In Georgine, the court did
not appoint additional class counsel, nor did it take any other procedural steps to protect the rights of the future class members in the
settlement negotiation process or during the process leading up to the
fairness hearing.82
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-40635 (5th Cir. Aug. 17,
1995).
81 See Appendix A to this Article concerning the use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) in mass-tort
settlements.
82 The district court in Georgine did, of course, find that the settlement was fair to the
"futures." Objectors argued that class counsel should be removed on the ground, among
others, that they could not represent both present and future class members. Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246,296 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated and remanded, Nos. 941925 et al., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11191 (3d Cir. May 10, 1996). Similarly, 37 academics
who teach and write in the area of legal ethics submitted an amicus brief, arguing, among
other things, that the district court should not approve any settlement before the court
appointed separate counsel for those class members who had not yet suffered an injury.
Amicus Brief at 2-4, Georgine, 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 93-0215). The motion
to allow the filing of that brief was denied by the district court, Georgine, No. 93-0215
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 1994) (order denying motion of certain law teachers to submit amicus
brief), as was a subsequent motion to reconsider. Georgine, No. 93..()215 (E.D. Pa. May 10,
1994) (order denying motion to reconsider).
79

80
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In Ahearn, after the complaint and settlement were filed, the
court did appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the future class
members. Although not ideal-since the future claimants' representative was not a participant in the already-completed bargaining-this
appointment was better than no separate representation at all. In theory, at least, the guardian ad litem was free to recommend rejection of
the proposed settlement or modification of its terms to better protect
future class members. Better still would be a requirement that future
class members always have separate representation during the original
settlement negotiation process. Assuming that the simultaneous filing
of a complaint and proposed settlement is proper in some situations,83
in those cases the court should immediately inquire as to whether
there was separate unconflicted representation for the future class
members. If not, the court should appoint such counsel and send the
parties back to the bargaining table.
2. Preliminary Hearing
In some of the settlement class actions in which we have participated, the preliminary hearing is little more than a formality, even
though that is when the court conditionally certifies the settlement
class, makes a preliminary evaluation of the proposed settlement's
fairness, appoints class counsel, and approves a notice plan pursuant
to Rules 23(c) and (e). For the purposes of this Article, we consider
the term "preliminary hearing" to mean the process by which the
court makes these threshold determinations, even though we realize
that the court may decide these issues in stages, through multiple
hearings, or without any in-person hearing at all.
We note at the outset that preliminary proceedings did take place
in two of the three actions discussed in Part II. In Georgine, there
were, in essence, two preliminary hearings. First, Judge Charles
Weiner, in a one-page order, preliminarily certified the class and appointed the two attorneys who had negotiated the settlement as class
counsel, subject to the appointment of additional counsel at a later
date.84 This was done without any input from the objectors or affected interest groups, or from attorneys who may have objected to
the appointment of class counsel. Later, however, the issues of preliminary fairness and the content and plan for dissemination of the
notice were the subject of serious in-depth briefing, argument, and
debate among many of the affected parties and interest groups before
See Appendix B to this Article.
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1993) (class certification order).
83
84
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Judge Lowell Reed, who had been appointed by Judge Weiner to han-dle matters leading up to and including the fairness hearing.ss
The breast-implant settlement was the subject of a significant
amount of public debate prior to the preliminary hearing. A Statement of Principles-which was a detailed explanation of the proposed
settlement-negotiated by the Plaintiffs' Negotiating Committee, was
circulated among many lawyers, victims' groups, potential class members, and others, as well as discussed in the media, in the months prior
to the formal announcement and filing of the proposed settlement.S6
Thereafter, the formal appointment of counsel, the finalization of the
proposed settlement, and the form and procedures for distribution of
the notice took place in an informal preliminary hearing held in chambers, to which the representatives of various interest groups were
invited.
In the GM-truck case, however, the preliminary "hearing," as far
as the record reveals, consisted of a motion to certify a settlement
class and dissemination of the notice to between five and six million
class members, as a result of a process in which the only participants
were plaintiffs' counsel and defendants' counsel, but no likely objectors or interest groups.87 A similar scenario occurred in In re Ford
Motor Co. Bronco II Products Liability Litigation,ss where about
700,000 owners of utility vehicles sought economic damage or a repair,
on the ground that the vehicles' allegedly defective design made them
prone to deadly rollover accidents. Shortly after various putative class
actions were transferred to the district court in New Orleans by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, a settlement was struck. The
court then certified a settlement class, appointed the plaintiffs' counsel
who had agreed to the settlement as class counsel, and permitted the
notice to be sent to hundreds of thousands of class members, without
any on-the-record preliminary hearing or express determination of
preliminary fairness.s9
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Statement of Principles, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (on file
with authors).
fr1 See supra Part ILC.
88 In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., No. IviDL-991 Section "0,"1995
U.S. Dist LEXIS 3507 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Bronco II] (order denying
approval of proposed settlement).
89 The Bronco ll settlement proposed to provide class members with a warning label,
owner's manual supplement, and a video describing how to drive utility vehicles safely, id.
at *2, which largely tracked a warning already required by federal regulation for all utility
vehicles. See 49 C.F.R. § 575.105 (1994) (requiring disclosure statement in Owner's Manual and prominently displayed warning label). The district court rejected the settlement,
among other reasons, on the grounds that it provided "effectively zero" in terms of what
was sought in the complaint, Bronco II, No. MDL-991 Section "G," 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
85
86
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In our view, certain preliminary-hearing requirements ought to
be formalized to achieve what the courts in Georgine and the breastimplant cases achieved, at least in part, on an ad hoc basis. In the
settlement class context, formal notification to the class members will
not have taken place at the time that the court determines to conditionally certify the case for settlement purposes. Nevertheless, the
settling parties should be required to notify persons and interest
groups that the settling parties would reasonably understand to have
an interest in the proceedings that a tentative settlement has been
reached, that a preliminary hearing will be scheduled, and that certain
issues will be considered at the hearing. This should usually include
notifying state attorneys general, perhaps through a representative
group, such as the National Association of Attorneys General. Sometimes the states have a direct legal interest in the settlements, such as
those involving motor vehicles which state agencies purchase in large
quantities;90 in other cases, they may wish to exercise their responsibilities as amici to protect their citizens.
Thus, in Georgine, the settling plaintiffs should have informed
members of the MDL Plaintiffs' Steering Committee and other interested plaintiffs' asbestos lawyers and asbestos victims' groups of the
proposed settlement and the date for a preliminary hearing, prior to
the initial class certification and appointment of counsel.91 As noted,
such notification should include advocacy groups that would be expected to take an interest in the subject matter of the settlement. At
least one such group-Command Trust Network, a support and advocacy group of women with breast implants-did take part in the for·
mal breast-implant settlement proceedings and helped shape the form
of notice, the objection and hearing schedules, and other procedural
matters. In General Motors, for example, counsel for the settling
plaintiffs would probably now agree that it was a mistake not to have
included the states in early settlement discussions or, at least, to have
involved them prior to preliminary approval. Similarly, if interested
groups had been contacted in the Bronco II case, the inadequate notice procedures may well have been avoided. 92
3507, at *19, that the warnings provided little more than what Ford was already required to
provide by law, id. at *19-*20, and that Ford's failure to oppose class counsel's "exorbitant"

$4-million fee request was evidence of possible collusion between class counsel and Ford.
Id. at *24-*29.
90 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
91 The class counsel in Georgine actually had discussions with attorneys for other asbes·
tos victims, thus enabling other affected parties to take part in the litigation at a relatively
early date.
92 In Bronco II, the settling parties maintained that notice of the settlement could be
sent to the addresses maintained by the state motor vehicle registration agencies and that
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In addition, the preliminary hearing is the place where the court
makes a preliminary determination of fairness. At bottom, this means
that the court should do at least two things. First, it must assure itself
that certain class members, whose claims would be barred by the proposed settlement, are not being given a zero recovery. An obvious
example of this is the loss-of-consortium claimants in the breastimplant case and Georgine, who obtain no recovery for themselves.93
If the court finds this type of inequity, and the settling parties provide
no adequate justification, the court should be obliged to send the parties back to the bargaining table. Second, even where all class members receive some potential benefit, the court should question at this
point whether the settlement contains any obvious allocation
problems, such as the three percent cap for foreign claimants in the
breast-implant case, which the settling parties later conceded was arbitrary and had no relationship to the strength of the foreigners' claims
or the expected number of foreign claimants.94
The preliminary hearing is also the appropriate time for the settling parties to disclose, or begin to disclose, the specific facts and evidence they intend to rely on in support of their claim that the
settlement is fair. While the settling parties need not at that time produce the actual documentary evidence on which they intend to rely in
every case, the court should be given the power to demand production
of such evidence and the names of the experts the settling parties intend to rely on in support of their fairness claim. This could include
providing support for any factual assertions that counsel have made in
their memorandum filed with the court to support the plan to disseminate the notice. At the very least, the court should require at this time
that the settling parties submit a general explanation for the various
allocations among the various subgroupings that make up the class,
which will allow the court and any objectors to question the wisdom of
the settlement and prevent dissemination of notice in cases where serious problems become evident. For example, in the Bronco II case,
this would reach 95% of the current owners of the vehicle. However, information derived
from a survey conducted by plaintiffs' expert after notification took place indicated that
over half of the class did not receive notice, probably because of inadequacies in the state
registration records. This problem could have been alleviated, in large part, through widespread publication notice, which has been employed by the courts when a large segment of
the class cannot be located individually. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10. In the
Bronco II case, the Center for Auto Safety-which later became involved as an objectorcould have assisted the court in its notice efforts, since the Center was aware of the
problems associated with relying solely on state registration records through its work on
vehicle recalls.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
94 See supra note 52 and accompanying text {discussing treatment of foreign claimants
in breast-implant and heart-valve litigations).
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since the class plaintiffs settled for warning stickers, rather than cash
or even coupons, counsel should have disclosed what, if any, research
and expert opinions they had obtained that demonstrated these warnings had value to the class members, i.e., that the warnings would be
heeded, and, if heeded, that injuries would be avoided and lives saved.
The purpose of such preliminary disclosures would be three-fold.
First, even in cases where there is little or no organized opposition to
the settlement, the court is under a duty to consider the fairness of the
settlement, and it cannot do so rationally without the type of information discussed above. Second, in cases where there is organized opposition, objectors are greatly hampered if they must file objections, as
we have often had to do, in a factual vacuum. Third, this disclosure
requirement might reduce or even eliminate the need for discovery
concerning the settlement terms during the period after the notice and
leading up to the fairness hearing, an issue we take up in the next
section.
Finally, since the preliminary hearing is where the court first certifies the class, the court should consider the question of class definition at that time. As noted above, in several recent cases-most
notably Georgine-the courts have been asked to exclude from the
class individuals who have cases pending on the date that the class
action was filed,9s despite the fact that the excluded individuals are
otherwise similarly situated to the class members. This raises two related concerns. First, the exclusion of the pending cases suggests that
the settling parties have attempted to buy off opposition to the class
by not offending counsel who represent individuals in pending cases
that might otherwise be preempted by the class action. Second, similar pending lawsuits may involve class counsel themselves, as was the
case in Georgine, where class counsel excluded thousands of their own
pending cases from the class definition, and then settled them on the
eve of the filing of the class action.96
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
The other two class actions that defined the class to exclude pending cases-Aheam
and Beeman-also involved situations where at least some of class counsel had litigation
pending against the defendant. Of course, even if pending cases were not excluded from
the class, the class members with pending cases could still opt out of the settlement if they
were included in the class. But that additional step is not a meaningless formality. Asking
that claimants with pending cases opt out should encourage, if not ensure, that the class
member who is represented in a pending action is consulted by his or her attorney and
makes a decision as to whether the class settlement provides a better deal. In the breast·
implant case, which did not exclude pending cases, many women with pending cases chose
not to opt out, but to take the class settlement. By contrast, in Georgine, individuals with
pending cases did not have this choice, having been excluded from the class action by the
class definition. For a detailed analysis of the problems associated with excluding from the
class cases pending on the filing date, see Koniak, supra note 20, at 1057-64.
95
96
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In our view, where the action seeks to define the class by excluding litigation pending on the date the complaint is filed or as of some
other arbitrary cutoff date, apparently unrelated to the defendant's
conduct or applicable law, the court should insist that there be a substantive reason for this exclusion.97 It is possible that a dramatic
change in applicable law or some other similar circumstance would
serve to differentiate the pending cases from the claims asserted by
the class. Otherwise, if the proposed settlement is a good deal for
those without pending cases, it ought to be a good deal for everyone
else as well. Thus, we propose the following Rule:
In any action certified under Rule 23(c)(l) for the purposes of settlement only, the court shall include as members of the class, subject
to the opt-out right of Rule 23{c)(2), all individuals who have pending actions against the defendant in a state or federal court concerning the same or substantially similar conduct alleged in the class
action complaint, unless the party or parties seeking class certification can demonstrate on the record that the individuals for whom
such exclusion is sought are so dissimilarly situated from the other
class members such that their exclusion from the class is appropriate
under the circumstances.

3. Discovery and Timing of Objections and Fairness Hearing
As indicated in the prior Section, we believe that information
concerning the justification for the settlement terms and the factual
basis for any assertions made by counsel concerning the strengths or
weaknesses of the case ought to be made available to the court and
objecting parties by the settling parties. For the reasons previously
given, we believe it will often be useful if this information is disclosed
when the settlement is first presented to the court. But if such disclosures are not made then, or are otherwise incomplete, objecting parties ought to be able to obtain the remainder of the relevant evidence
shortly after the notice is sent out.
We recognize that the case law suggests that the discovery Rules
ought not to apply fully to settlement proceedings under Rule 23(e),
on the ground that full discovery would eliminate the efficiency gained
by the settlement itself and would enmesh the court in conducting the
very pretrial and trial proceedings that the settlement was intended to
avoid.98 We believe that this position overstates the case for two re97 For example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), discussed supra
Part I.B, the cutoff date was defined by reference to the statute of limitations.
98 See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Til. Nat'l Bank & 1hlst Co., 834 F.2d 677,
684 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The temptation to convert a settlement hearing into a full trial on the
merits must be resisted.").
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lated reasons. First, in the complex class actions that we have discussed, including particularly the mass-tort settlements that devise
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, the class action settlement
eliminates not simply one trial on the merits, but potential pretrial
discovery and trial in thousands, if not tens of thousands, of cases.
The fact that there might be the need for considerable discovery and
an in-depth settlement hearing hardly puts a dent in the overall efficiencies gained by approval of these complex settlements.99 In some
cases, objectors will be able to provide their own evidence on the legal
strengths and weaknesses of the plaintiffs' claims. However, much of
the factual evidence can only come from the settling parties. For instance, in mass-tort cases providing monetary relief for personal injuries, the settling parties ought to be required to come forward, as they
did in part in Georgine, with historical data concerning prior
settlements. too

99 The fairness hearing in Georgine involved 18 days of testimony and a day of closing
arguments, in addition to preliminary hearings on the jurisdictional questions and on discovery disputes, plus more than 30 depositions and the submission of other disclosures
from the settling parties and objectors. On the other hand, in the breast-implant case,
there was very little formal discovery regarding the settlement and the fairness hearing was
only three days long, involving very brief presentations by the settling parties and objectors
and no testimony. The GM-truck fairness hearing was less than one day; the heart-valve
fairness hearing totalled four days; and the Bronco II hearing was just a few hours.
IOO In the Bronco II case, the settling parties argued that the underlying claim concerning the vehicle's rollover propensity was weak, noting that all but one of the half dozen
personal-injury cases that had been tried ended in defendants' verdicts. However, objectors represented by the authors herein sought discovery of the settlements of hundreds of
other personal-injury cases which press reports indicated were substantial. The court denied that request, Bronco II, No. MDL-991 Section "G,"1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15867, at
*14 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 1994) (order denying, in part, objecting settlement class members'
request to conduct further discovery) (finding that "track record" of settlements was already before court), but after the objectors moved for consideration, the court reversed
itself at the fairness hearing and ordered production of the information within 48 hours.
Bronco II, No. MDL-991 Section "G," 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16118, at *3-*4 (E.D. La.
Nov. 8, 1994) (order granting, on partial reconsideration, objecting settlement class members' request to conduct further discovery) (finding that, although amounts of jury verdicts
were before court, settlement amounts were not). Defendant Ford then moved for a protective order and submitted the settlement data in camera. The court did not ultimately
demand the public release of each individual settlement agreement, but, in its opinion rejecting the settlement, it did make public the aggregate settlement data (the total number
of claims, the number of claims broken down by the type of injury alleged, the range of
settlements in dollar amounts, and the total dollar value of the settlements). The court
agreed with the objectors that the defendant's prior settlements were relevant to the
strength or weakness of the underlying claims in the class action, noting that the substantial
settlements reached, averaging over $330,000 and ranging to more than $4 million In individual cases, Bronco II, No. MDL-991 Section "G," 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3507, at *17
(E.D. La. Mar. 15, 1995) (order denying approval of proposed settlement), was evidence of
the inadequacy of the class settlement. Id. at *32.
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Further, in cases such as the heart-valve and GM situations,
where class counsel took little or no formal discovery, objectors ought
to be able to take discovery on the extent of the investigation done by
plaintiffs' counsel, as that will not necessarily be apparent from the
court docket. Since that is a factor that courts take into account in
reviewing the adequacy of class action settlements, it is a proper topic
for discovery.lo1
Second, frequently the discovery sought will not concern the
strength or weakness of the claims that would be litigated if the case
went to trial, but rather justification for the settlement terms themselves, especially where relief other than money damages to the class
is included. Thus, it would have been entirely appropriate in the
heart-valve case to take discovery on whether it was possible to develop, in the relatively near future, a diagnostic device for noninvasive
detection of heart-valve fractures, since the settlement sets aside tens
of millions of dollars to perform research on that topic, among
others.l02 Similarly, in determining both whether the settlement terms
were fair and whether counsel had represented the class adequately, it
would have been appropriate to discover all evidence, including expert opinions, as to the degree to which class members would be likely
to utilize the coupons during the redemption period in the GM case.
Although in many of our cases we have been able to obtain some
discovery, there has been a significant problem as to timing. Because
the settling parties have not had to disclose the factual bases or justifications for the settlement, and because they typically provide evidentiary support for the settlement terms only after the objectors have
attacked the proposed settlement, objectors have been left scrambling, on the eve of the fairness hearing, to take discovery and respond for the first time to the settling parties' defense of the
settlement.
In the GM-truck case, for instance, objections were due a little
more than a month after notice reached the class members, leaving
inadequate time for discovery. Class counsel filed papers in support
of the proposed settlement, but without any evidentiary basis for the
settlement, i.e., the degree to which class members would be able to
use the coupons or the likelihood that a secondary market in the coupons would develop. Thereafter, objectors responded with affidavits
from marketing and other experts as to the likely redemption rate for
the coupons and on the secondary-market issue, among other issues.
101 See 2 Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 11.41, at 11-91
(3d ed. 1992); see also In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F3d 768, 814 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
102 Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 148-49 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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Then, in a filing made just eight days prior to the fairness hearing, and
served on counsel for the objectors just a few business days before the
hearing, class counsel responded for the first time with evidentiary
support for the settlement, involving many extensive affidavits and
documents, including a postsettlement marketing survey of truck owners conducted by an expert whose affidavit and survey results were
presented to the court. This was hardly appropriate if one takes seriously the oft-repeated notion that the burden of showing the fairness
of a proposed class action settlement rests squarely on its
proponents. 103
Similarly, in the Bronco II litigation, notice was given by mail to
vehicle owners less than one month prior to the date by which objections were due, and counsel for objectors learned of the settlement
about a week later. The notice provided that all objectors were required to present all evidentiary materials in support of those objections by the due date. However, objectors were not served with the
settling parties' supporting memoranda until one week prior to the
objection date, and those memoranda were not accompanied by any
evidentiary support. Thereafter, objectors sought discovery which was
allowed in part, but the answers were largely objections on privilege
and relevance grounds and were served on the objectors on the Saturday prior to the hearing scheduled for the following Thesday. Moreover, as in the GM case, only after objectors filed their evidence,
including expert affidavits and documentary materials, did the settling
parties come forth for the first time with their expert evidence and
factual bases for the settlement. These were served on the objectors
approximately one week prior to the fairness hearing, with the settling
parties maintaining that no further response from objectors was permissible. The court did, however, permit further response by the settling parties and objectors after the fairness hearing.
In the Mustang-convertible coupon settlement,l04 the court did
not provide a period for discovery, and counsel for the settling parties
refused to provide the objectors with any information, including a
copy of the settlement agreement and the complaint, prior to the date
objections were due. Thus, objectors were required to piece together
their objections without the pertinent information.1os Nevertheless,
the court apparently saw no problem with this and approved the set103 See, e.g., 2 Newberg & Conte, supra note 101, § 11.42, at 11-94 to -95; id. at 2S·61
(Supp. 1995).
104 See supra note 73.
lOS Declaration of Allison M. Zieve <JII 2-4, Memorandum in Opposition to Proposed
Settlement and Proposed Fees and Expenses (Apr. 14, 1995), Dale v. Ford Motor Co., No.
661492 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange County Apr. 14, 1995) (class counsel instructed associate
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tlement after a fairness hearing lasting less than thirty minutes, at
which the settling parties provided no evidentiary support for the
settlement.106
The fundamental problem with these cases is that Rule 23 and
common practice appear to permit what we have encountered. or at
least do not forbid it. In addition to the preliminary disclosure requirements set out in the prior section of this Article, Rule 23(e)
should be amended to allow proper discovery and full presentation of
evidence by expressly permitting a period of preparation and discovery of not less than sixty days after the notice and opt-out period has
ended. During that time, the settling parties must come fonvard with
their papers in support of the settlement, including not only the legal
justifications for the settlement, but also the specific factual evidence-including affidavits, documents, and the like-upon which
they intend to rely. In Georgine, discovery took place during the notice and opt-out period, because objectors-principally asbestos
personal-injury attorneys-had already known of the proposed settlement for many months. Generally, however, since the principal purpose of the notice is to apprise the class members of the settlement
and to allow them to object, time for discovery should be allowed after
the notice period has concluded.107 At the close of this discovery period, consistent with their burden to demonstrate the settlement's fairness, the settling parties should be required to come fonvard with
their evidentiary support for the settlement1os Thereafter, a period of
not less than forty-five days should be allowed for the submission of
not to send out any documents and refused to send out complaint on ground that it was
"work product").
106 By contrast, timing in Georgine and the breast-implant case was not an impediment
to the proper presentation of objections, as the court gave potential objectors adequate
time to prepare their objections and required the settling parties, through discovery or
otherwise, to disclose their justifications for the settlement terms. Although we have several serious disagreements with the court's determinations on what was discoverable in
Georgine, which are not relevant here, the methodical approach taken on jurisdictional,
preliminary fairness, discovery, and the fairness hearing itself, succeeded in preventing the
type of sandbagging that occurred in the actions described in the text.
107 The authors herein represented objectors in the General Motors and Bronco II actions, but they knew nothing of the settlements until they received copies of the notice
from one of their clients, the Center for Auto Safety. Indeed, the Center itself, which had
been working for years on the underlying product defect issues with respect to both vehicles, did not learn of the settlements until shortly before objections were due.
108 In the GM case, for instance, this would have included the survey of truck owners
that was sprung on the objectors just prior to the fairness hearing and that served as the
main support for the district court's finding of fairness. See In re General Motors Corp.
Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 846 F. Supp. 330, 338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd,
55 F3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
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formal objections, responses by the settling parties, and replies prior
to the fairness hearing.1o9
B.
1.

Substantive Changes To Assure Fairness

Authority of Court To Impose or Reject Certain Terms

The basic protections currently afforded unrepresented class
members by the Federal Ru1es of Civil Procedure are largely procedural. Under current law, judges do not have the power to reject
some portions of a settlement while accepting others, nor may they
impose terms on the parties. After the fairness hearing, they are
forced into an up-or-down decision on whether the settlement should
be approved. Despite this, there are at least some judges who are
prepared to threaten to reject the settlement unless the parties make
certain changes, which the parties sometimes accept, at least in part. 110
This ali-or-nothing approach for settlements in class actions is
sensible where the only issue is whether the amount that the defendants have agreed to pay the plaintiff class is reasonable. In such a
case, all of the class members are similarly situated or, if not, there is a
relatively simple way of providing proportional relief to the class
members.1 11 The principal problem in the complex tort litigations discussed above is that all members are not similarly situated, and there
are serious fairness issues regarding the internal allocation of funds
among the different groups within the class. The total settlement
amount may be within reason, but the internal allocations are not.
In order to deal with this problem, we propose that district judges
be given the power to make certain reallocation decisions, described
below, in order to assure fairness within the class, as well as between
109 The proper time for exercise of the opt-out right is beyond the scope of this Article.
We note, however, that there is an argument that, because class members are typically
asked to opt out at the end of the notice period, which is the same time that objections are
due, the opt-out decision comes prior to the point where class members have a fair oppor·
tunity to evaluate the arguments on both sides of the settlement. For this reason, it may be
better to allow the opt out to be exercised at some later point down the road, such as 30
days before the fairness hearing, or within a short period thereafter, prior to the time that
the court has issued its ruling. This would have the additional advantage of lending some
symmetry to the process, since courts, in our experience, almost always let class members
opt back in after the fairness hearing and/or court approval of the settlement.
no This was done in the heart-valve settlement class action, where the court issued an
interim order, pointing out particular areas of concern, Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D.
138, 139-41 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (continuing fairness hearing pending report of parties as to
"ambiguities in" and "concerns with" proposed settlement expressed by court), and later
approved the settlement which had been amended to include some, if not all, of the court's
"suggestions." Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 170 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (approving
settlement as "good deal for class members").
111 See supra Part I.B (discussing allocation of relief in Goldfarb).

April-May 1996]

REPRESENTING THE UNREPRESENTED

491

the class and defendants. In one respect, courts already do this since
class counsel fees are determined by the court, and, depending on the
court's fee determination, the amount allocated to the class, as opposed to its lawyers, is somewhat within the control of the court, at
least in cases where the fee is to be paid from the common fund created for the class's benefit. It is essential that the courts make that
allocation because of the obvious concern \vith adequacy of representation of the unrepresented portion of the class vis-a-vis the interest of
the class counsel. In our view, the same concerns about adequacy of
representation should entitle the court to make other internal allocation decisions as we11.112
Several examples in the silicone-gel breast-implant and asbestos
cases illustrate the need for internal reallocations which could be done
without altering the settlement as a whole. Consider the issue of
claims for loss of consortium which were eliminated as part of the
settlements in both cases.113 In our view it is never proper to eliminate the viable claims of certain class members as the price of paying
for other viable claims of other class members, and therefore the
courts should have refused to approve either settlement The difficulty is that loss-of-consortium claims are a small part of the total
claims, yet the judge, under current law, is placed in a take-it-or-leaveit situation for the settlement as a whole. In our view, giving the district judge the right to make modest adjustments within the basic confines of the settlement is far preferable to the present inflexible rule.
If trial judges were given authority to reallocate funds among the
members of the class, in most cases it would not be necessary for the
court itself to do the reallocation. Take, for instance, setting the figure
for loss-of-consortium claims: The court could simply direct the plaintiffs either to make internal reallocations or to obtain additional funds
from the defendant to reasonably compensate the loss-of-consortium
claimants. In each case, the question then would be whether the
amounts that the parties provided were reasonable under the circumstances. Indeed, in most of these cases, the loss-of-consortium claims
would not be very great compared to the overall fund, although there
would be some claimants for whom the claim would be substantial,
such as a husband who had to give up a lucrative job in order to take
112 We hope that there will be less need for reallocations if, as we suggest above, the
Plaintiffs' Negotiating Committee adequately represents the principal divergent interests in
the class. But, for instance, one representative out of five for foreign claimants would not
have assured a different outcome for foreign claimants in the breast-implant case, since
that person could easily be outvoted. Hence, the need for court supervision of the internal
allocation decisions would continue.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
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care of his wife who was immobilized due to a silicone-gel breast implant. In those cases, it would be necessary either to provide for adequate compensation for the truly seriously injured spouse, or at least
to give that spouse the right to opt out separately from the primary
victim, instead of joining the two together as the settlement now
provides.
A second example involves the issue of inflation. With a fixed
pot of money, it is clear that there is an intraclass conflict on how the
money is divided between present (or near-present) and future claimants.114 The court should not be permitted to order the defendant to
pay additional amounts of money so that the amounts paid would be
the same from year to year in real dollar terms. But the court would,
under our approach, have the authority to direct the parties to cure
the existing inequity, which might include adjustments in the amounts
paid to both present and future claimants to take into account the
effect of inflation, or at least to make the future claimants opt out on a
real dollar (reduced face amount) basis.
The grid used in the breast-implant case11s also creates internal
allocation problems, even for current claimants. Aside from issues
about whether some diseases that are not on the grid should be on the
grid (and vice versa), some observers believe that some dollar recoveries are too high, whereas others are too low. There also appear to
be some internal conflicts regarding the rationality of the various steps
on the grid as they relate to the level of severity and the age of onset.
Assuming that a court found any of these differentiations to be without an evidentiary or logical basis, it should not be faced with an
either/or choice of approving or disapproving the settlement, but
should be allowed to correct the grid or at least direct the parties to
make the grid more rational.
Then there are the problems of the foreign claimants. The three
percent cap included by the plaintiffs has been conceded to have no
reasonable basis in its relationship to the number of foreign versus
domestic claims or the total amount of recovery to which foreign
claimants would be entitled.116 The court should have been permitted
to eliminate the cap and to direct the parties to come up with some
other system. This might have included an alternative grid for foreign
claimants, which is already contemplated under the settlement, but
without a percentage cap, such as one similar to that used in the heart114
115
116

See, e.g., discussion supra text accompanying notes 33-42.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra text accompanying note 52.
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valve litigation.117 Such a foreign-claimant grid would take into account the fact that the legal systems and typical recoveries in foreign
countries differ from those in the United States and, indeed, differ
from each other. But whatever the numbers may be, the three percent cap was not rational, and the court should have had the power to
direct its elimination.
If these internal adjustments had been made in the breast-implant
case, the defendants' obligations might have appeared to have been
unchanged. However, changes in the internal allocation might have
caused some people to stay in the case and others to opt out. But
even if there were some negative effects on defendants from any or all
of these changes, they would be quite minimal, particularly given the
size of the overall settlement. Moreover, if judges could only make
reallocations where there was absolutely no effect on the defendants,
the plaintiffs could use the excuse that defendants might have to pay a
small additional amount, if certain contingencies arise, to avoid all internal changes that would benefit the unrepresented class members.
Accordingly, we propose that Rule 23 be amended to permit the court
to disapprove portions of a settlement agreement and to require other
provisions to be included, provided that the adjustments result in "no
substantial change in the obligations of the defendant." 118
In addition, the court should be entitled to change the obligations
of the defendants if there are conditions in an overall reasonable settlement that nonetheless favor the defendants in a manner that is fundamentally unfair, in part because plaintiffs' counsel had their own
reasons for going along with them, despite the best interests of the
class. One particular condition that illustrates the problem, present in
the silicone-gel breast-implant case, relates to the question of the timing of the defendants' payments into the settlement fund, in particular
the condition that the payments do not start until all appeals from the
117 See supra note 52 (discussing treatment of foreign claimants in heart-valve
litigation).
us A separate question arises as to whether, if the court makes such changes, an additional notice and opportunity to opt out would have to be provided. In our view, that
would depend on the significance of the changes to the adversely affected groups. Thus, if
a loss-of-consortium payment to a small number of class members were required, the reduction for the rest of the class might be insignificant Other changes might require another opportunity for opt out for at least those who were seriously disadvantaged by the
internal reallocation. Moreover, rather than risk the wrath of other class members who
already claim "entitlement" to their allocations, a defendant would be free to add money
to the overall fund and to smooth out allocation problems in that manner. This is precisely
what occurred in the heart-valve case, where the settling parties did not touch the S80million medical-consultation fund for principal claimants' fear claims, but simply added
another $10 million for the spousal claimants. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 149,
170 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (noting and approving spousal claimant addition).

494

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 71:439

fairness determination are concluded. 119 We recognize that a defendant has a legitimate interest in seeing that whatever money is paid
during the settlement process is not spent (except for agreed-upon
matters such as notice and claims administration), and that it does not
pay money into court without receiving "credit" for the interest
earned prior to final judgment against its total obligation.
On the other hand, the class as a whole wants the money paid as
soon as possible and with interest. Furthermore, the court and the
members of the class, in evaluating whether a settlement is reasonable, need to know with some degree of certainty the dates that all
payments will be made so that there can be a calculation, even on a
discounted basis, of the actual value of the settlement. This is particularly true in cases in which there is a substantial delay between the
time of the settlement agreement and the starting payment date. And
when, as in the silicone-gel breast-implant case, the payments span
thirty years, the initial delay means a delay in every future payment,
which can substantially reduce the present value of the settlement.
As a result of these tensions, plaintiffs try to get the money paid
in (but agree not to pay it out) as soon as possible (which does not
create any potential conflict with the class). However, in a number of
cases, such as the breast-implant case, they also agree not to require
payment in until all rights of appeal have expired. This latter condition creates a very substantial incentive for plaintiffs' counsel (and to
a considerable extent the district judge) to cut short the time before
the fairness hearing, because every day delayed is a day the money
does not come into the plaintiffs' bank account and start to earn interest for the class. Moreover, it operates to create the possibility of improper coercion regarding an appeal in two separate respects. On the
one hand, unscrupulous lawyers can demand substantial benefits for
themselves and their clients by agreeing to abandon their appeal. On
the other hand, those who oppose the settlement on principle, often
because of internal allocation questions, can be subject to severe criticism from other victims-as can their lawyers-because they are
"holding up" the settlement and "costing" the class hundreds or perhaps thousands of dollars a day, if not more.
Tying the payments to dates when no further appeals are pending,
without requiring prepayment of interest, should be eliminated by
Rule or court decision. If there is no time certain for all payments,
interest must accrue from the date on which the settlement agreement
is filed, or some other date reasonably close to that, at whatever reasonable rate can be agreed upon, or in the absence of agreement, at
119

See supra Part II.B.4.
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the judgment rate payable in civil litigation generally.120 Under such a
system, if more time is needed to permit absent class members to participate meaningfully in the fairness hearing, or for the court to conduct the hearing and render its decision, including making any
necessary reallocations, it will not result in interest lost for the benefit
of the class. Similarly, while an appeal \vill delay the payment to class
members, it will not result in lost interest. Most important from the
perspective of both the court and the class members, a date certain in
the payment plan increases the ability of all concerned to make a
meaningful assessment of the actual value of the settlement, unlike at
present when no one knows when the first or subsequent payments
will be made.
The authority to correct the timing problems for payments by the
defendant is one illustration of the power that courts should have to
say "no" without jeopardizing the entire settlement. There may be
others, although we have not identified any that are sufficiently serious to warrant a specific prohibition. For the present, we suggest only
that the courts be on the lookout for similar provisions and urge the
parties to modify them. And the best time to identify such problems
and attempt to deal with them is after the parties have reached a tentative settlement, but before notice goes out to the class informing
them of the settlement terms.

2. Substantive Protection for Subgroups Within the Class
As discussed earlier,l21 the appointment of separate representatives for future class members and other class members falling in distinct subgroups will go a long way toward ensuring fair outcomes.
Moreover, in the preceding Section, we argued that the court should
be given the power to reallocate funds within the settlement provided
that the overall exposure for the defendant remains approximately the
same. This, too, would allow the court to protect some of the subgroups within the class that were treated unfairly by the settling parties. In addition, we believe that the Rule should be changed to
require the court to undertake a substantive evaluation of the settlement's fairness to subgroup members, particularly those \vith potential
future claims.
It might be argued that courts are already under such an implicit
duty under Rule 23(e). To be sure, Rule 23(e) provides that the dismissal and compromise of class actions must be approved by the court
and that notice of such dismissal or settlement be given to class mem120 See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 {1994).
121 See supra Part ill.A.l.
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bers. However, no standards for evaluating a proposed settlement are
provided in the Rule, and the "universally applied standard is whether
the settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable." 122
Appellate courts have laid down various factors to be considered in
evaluating whether a class settlement should be approved,1 23 but the
factors themselves are vague and unclear and often there is little guidance on which factors, if any, are more important than the others, or
which can be ignored in certain circumstances.t24
Further, the use of these factors is almost always accompanied by
the admonition that settlements come to the court with a presumption
of fairness and are favored by the law.125 Finally, neither the Rule nor
any of the tests for settlement approval appears to have considered
the special problems posed by settlement class actions, the inclusion in
settlements of future claimants who are not currently entitled to relief,
or settlements where the relief agreed upon was not of the type sought
in the complaint.1 26 Thus, as we now explain, we suggest that certain
substantive protections be provided under Rule 23(e).

a. Protection for Future Claimants. In order that the court be
required to focus on the particular problems of future class members,
we suggest that Rule 23(e) be amended to provide:
122 See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615.625 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983).
123 See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1209 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
828 (1982) (listing six factors that "should be considered" in evaluating settlement proposals); Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) (listing nine factors relevant to decision whether to approve settlement).
124 For instance, in approving the GM-truck settlement, both the district court and tho
court of appeals reviewed the factors laid down by the Third Circuit in Girsh. When it
came to whether the defendant "could withstand a greater judgment"-a factor which
would seem to work against approval with a defendant like GM-the district court noted
that GM could withstand a greater judgment, but then stated, without further explanation,
that this factor neither favored nor disfavored the settlement, In re General Motors Corp.
Pickup Truck Fuel Thnk Prods. Liab. Litig., 846 F. Supp. 330, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1993), a holding
that, surprisingly, the court of appeals did not disturb. In re General Motors Corp. PickUp Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 818 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
88 (1995); see also, e.g.• Stoetzner v. United States Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 118 (3d Cir.
1990) (declining to apply all nine Girsh "proposed settlement" factors, noting that some
were "inapposite" where settlement occurred after case had been tried to judgment).
125 See 2 Newberg & Conte, supra note 101, § 11.41, at 11-88 & n.224 (noting "initial
presumption of fairness" of proposed class settlement).
126 But see, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (requiring
"clearer showing of a settlement's ... adequacy" where settlement was reached prior to
court certifying class), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental IIi.
Nat'l Bank & 'Ii'ust Co., 834 F.2d 677,681 (7th Cir. 1987) (same); cf. In re General Motors,
55 F.3d at 792-800 (settlement classes are permissible, but trial court ultimately must find
that Rule 23 prerequisites for litigation class have been met). Accord General Motors
Corp. v. Bloyed, No. 94-0777, 1996 WL 51180 (Tex. Feb. 9, 1996).
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In considering any proposed settlement under this Rule in which
some class members would only be entitled to relief if certain events
occur in the future, the court shall determine whether, for such class
members, other or additional relief is required to assure that the
settlement is fair to those class members.

Under this formulation, the court would not be required to reject
a settlement, such as those reached in the breast-implant case or in
Georgine. However, in such cases, courts would be required to consider whether, for instance, the claims for medical monitoring in
Georgine, which might not have been of any benefit to currently injured class members, were properly abrogated for future class members who might well have benefitted from such relief. The court might
ultimately conclude that the other benefits for future class members
warranted the abrogation of the medical-monitoring claims, but it
could not avoid the issue.127
In cases involving payment of monetary relief to individuals
harmed in the future, inflation is of such obvious concern to future
claimants that it should be specifically addressed in every settlement
class action. We propose the following Rule:
In cases providing monetary relief for class members who vlill suffer
injuries in the future, the court may not approve a settlement that
does not make periodic adjustments to take into account increases
in the cost of living, both generally and with respect to subcomponents of the cost of living for the type of costs for which the monetary relief is provided, unless the settling parties show, and the
court finds, that there is good cause why such periodic adjustments
should not be made.
This Rule would establish a presumption in favor of a cost-ofliving adjustment that would be difficult to overcome. Mere speculation that tort awards would not keep pace \vith inflation in the future,
that "tort reform" was in the offing, or that a substantial portion of the
"futures" class might be subject to statutes of limitations defenses not
applicable to presen~y injured class members, would not suffice. The
settling parties would need to present hard evidence that all or sub127 We note that a fund was created in the breast-implant case to provide limited medical monitoring and to pay for explantation of existing implants. In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Sept.
1, 1994). Similarly, in the-heart-valve case, if a medical device is developed that will provide noninvasive diagnosis of valves that are prone to deadly fractures, the settlement will
pay the unreimbursed costs of such diagnosis. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 149
(S.D. Ohio 1992). The heart-valve settlement also sets aside funds to conduct research to
develop that type of medical device and to pay for surgery to replace fracture-prone valves
with safer heart valves. Id.
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stantially all members of the "futures" class almost certainly would be
facing these difficulties in order to avoid an inflation adjustment.

b. Protecting Against the Elimination of Viable Claims. As
noted previously, in this new breed of class action settlement, certain
class members who, under applicable law, would have a substantial
opportunity to obtain recovery are provided no relief. Included in this
category are certain lung-cancer sufferers and the pleural claimants in
Georgine, 128 and the two categories of breast-cancer victims in the
breast-implant case discussed above. 129 In our view, the Rules should
require the court to reject settlements which provide no compensation
for claimants who are giving up potentially viable claims, unless the
court finds that the settlement provides benefits to those claimants
that are comparable to those claims being abrogated.
In Georgine, the court did make this finding of equivalence, but
in certain respects it is plainly suspect. For instance, pleural claimants
who are of advanced age, and therefore extremely unlikely to contract
more advanced asbestos-related illnesses, but who currently have
pleural claims that have considerable value under state law, cannot
reasonably be seen to be gaining equivalent, if any, value from the
settlement's waiver of statutes of limitations and its "reentry"
rights. 130 In the breast-implant case, the district court did not address
the abrogation of the cancer or breast-cancer masking claims at all.
Elimination of such claims for no value would not survive a Rule of
the type that we propose. Finally, the complete elimination of loss-ofconsortium claims-which are the only claims of large segments of the
Georgine and breast-implant class-could not be achieved under our
proposal.131
c. Dealing with Differences in Applicable Law. The Rules
should also require the court to examine whether there are differences
among applicable laws, such that class members from one state or
groups of states would be unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged,132
See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
See supra text accompanying note 53.
Reentry rights refer to the fact that, under the Georgine settlement, a claimant can
recover once for a nonmalignant disease and again for a malignancy, assuming that the
claimant has met the medical criteria of the settlement in both instances. Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated and remanded, Nos. 941925 et al., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11191 (3d Cir. May 10, 1996).
131 Some of these allocation problems could be resolved by giving the court authority to
reallocate funds within the overall settlement fund, as we suggest supra Part III.B.l.
132 Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 (1985) (in multistate class
action, due process forbids application of forum state's law to class members who have no
significant connection with that state).
128
129
130
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Georgine purports to get at this problem, as we have noted before, by
allowing the claims adjudicator to take into account differences in applicable law or at least settlement history from different jurisdictions.133 That settlement also deals, appropriately in our view, with
problems concerning applicable statutes of limitations and repose by
barring any claims that would have been time barred when the class
action complaint was :filed.134
However, most of the other natiomvide class actions discussed
above wholly ignored differences in applicable law. This was perhaps
understandable in the breast-implant case, where there was virtually
no track record upon which to base such determinations and where it
was far from clear that any differences in applicable law would have
made a substantial difference to individual class members. That being
the case, there was a good argument that the reduction in cost to all
class members of avoiding such issues justified the across-the-board
approach for all U.S. claimants. In the heart-valve case, however,
there was strong evidence that class members able to take advantage
of California law were in a much better position than all other class
members with respect to their claims based on fear that their heart
valves would fracture.I3s
In the Bronco II case, class counsel themselves, in explaining to
the MDL judge why they had filed their fee application in Alabama
state court, rather than the federal court, argued strenuously that they
had sought an Alabama forum as well as a federal forum because the
subclass of Alabama vehicle owners had a much stronger case than
the other class members because of special provisions of Alabama
law. Nevertheless, Alabamans were accorded no additional relief. 136
Georgine SOS, supra note 25, at 57.
Id. at 49.
135 The defendants were successful in 27 cases in obtaining rulings that plaintiffs with
working valves could not recover for their fear that the valve might someday fracture.
Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.RD. 141, 162 (S.D. Ohio 1992). However, in California, the
Court of Appeal had held that plaintiffs could recover on those claims if they could prove
that the defendant had fraudulently marketed the valve by covering up its propensity to
fracture. Khan v. Shiley. 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (4th Dist 1990). While the district court
in Bowling correctly noted that proving liability under this theory might be difficult,
Bowling, 143 F.RD. at 164, the California precedent surely made the claims of class members who would be able to rely on California law much stronger than those of other class
members. Indeed, shortly after the class settlement was approved, hundreds of plaintiffs
who had opted out won settlements of their fear claims that greatly outstripped what the
settlement afforded the class members. See, e.g., $31-Million Settlement May Be in Works
on Shiley Heart Valve, L.A. TIDles {Orange County ed.), Oct 17, 1992, at Dl. Those
outside settlements provided significantly greater relief to Californians than to either nonCalifornia U.S. residents or to foreigners.
136 It is useful to provide a little more background to the unusual fee issue in the Bronco
II case: The settling parties agreed simultaneously to two identical nationwide class actions
133
134
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In our view, the question of applicable law and how it affects disparate groups among the class is different, and more difficult, than the
questions presented in the two prior Sections of this Article regarding
future class members and the problem of eliminating viable claims.
Applicable law is difficult to discern, is often in a state of flux, and the
differences among various state laws may affect some, but not all, theories of the plaintiffs' recovery or the applicable defenses (e.g., where
one of the plaintiffs' claims is based on federal law). Further, there is
little likelihood that, in the national class actions that we have addressed, the issue of which law is applicable will cause class counsel
deliberately to sell out one group of clients for another. Indeed, it is
noteworthy that, where differences in applicable law have been overlooked, the result is that everybody in the class gets the same thing,
not that some of the class gets nothing. Thus, unlike the zero-recovery
and future class member problems discussed above, the courts should
review nationwide settlements with an eye toward the problems posed
by differences in applicable law, but only disapprove such settlements
if, as in the heart-valve settlement example, there is a clear problem.
Similarly, before scuttling any settlement on the basis of differences in applicable law, the court should be clear not only on the differences in legal position among class members, but also that the
differences in applicable law have a substantial effect on the class. For
instance, a settlement that protects class members in a few states that
have statutes of repose is not worth "correcting," especially if "overpaying" those class members costs the remainder of the class only a
relatively few dollars per person and it is not certain whether class
members residing in statute-of-repose states could sue elsewhere. On
the other hand, if, as in the heart-valve example, the residents of one
state lost substantial benefits by, in effect, providing relief to the rest
involving the same plaintiffs' counsel, one in Alabama state court and one in federal dis·
trict court in New Orleans, where, as noted earlier, several class actions had been consoll·
dated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Without providing any explaniltion
as to why two settlements were necessary or even arguably beneficial to the class, the
settlement agreement provided that the agreement would be void if either settlement did
not obtain final court approval. The only difference between the two proceedings was that
the fees would be sought only in Alabama, thus circumventing the federal court's approval
for work done before it. In the Alabama court, class counsel sought an award of $4 million
in a one-page fee application, accompanied by less than 10 pages of affidavits explaining
counsel's background, but without any time or expense records or any explanation of how
the $4 million request was calculated. The defendant, Ford Motor Company, did not ob·
ject to the award, although it retained the right to do so in the settlement agreement, see
Bronco II, No. MDL-991 Section "0," 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3507, at *27·*28 (E.D. La.
Mar. 15, 1995) (order denying approval of proposed settlement), and class counsel de·
fended the fee request, in part, on the ground that since the defendant was paying, the class
was not harmed thereby. See also Alison Frankel, Brake on Ford Fee, Am. Law., Mar.
1995, at 19 (discussing debate between parties over appropriate fee for class counsel).
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of the world, the court should not approve the settlement unless the
inequalities are corrected or substantially reduced.137

3.

Protecting Class Members in Cases Providing Nonmonetary
Relief

We now turn to the question posed by Rule 23(b)(3) class settlements
that provide nonmonetary relief of the type that ordinarily could not
be awarded by a court or jury in litigation. In our view, settlements
that propose to provide nonmonetary relief should be a warning signal
to the court that certain segments of the class may be left out in the
cold. The question in those cases-for instance, in the GM-truck coupon settlement discussed above138-is whether, as a practical matter,
the settlement will be able to provide relief to all or substantially all of
the class members whose claims are being precluded by the judgment.
Before approving any settlement, the court should apply the following test:
In reviewing a settlement in an action certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
if the settlement does not provide the opportunity for each class
member to obtain monetary relief, the court shall determine
137 One area in which there are substantial differences in applicable law is punitive damages. Some states never allow them, while others allow them only in very limited circumstances, and still others are quite generous. Some states have stringent burdens of proof,
while others have caps, calculated in different ways. Although punitive damages are infrequently awarded, and the awards often reduced, the possibility of a large award certainly
carries some weight in settling some individual cases. See David G. Owen, A Punitive
Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 Viii. L. Rev. 363, 366-70 (1994)
(reviewing various permutations). Thus, because awards in mass-tort settlements do not
take into account the effect that punitive damages might have had on different segments of
the class, it might be argued that some claimants are being improperly forced to give up a
valuable right for the benefit of the class as a whole.
There are several possible responses, none of them definitive. For example, the right
to opt out will, at least for current claimants, give some comfort that the trade-off is not
fundamentally unfair. Moreover, in some cases, the opportunity for substantial punitive
damages may be small, either because the conduct was not egregious, or the defendant is
not rich and/or able to stand many such awards. In other cases, simply because the states
of residence of some of the plaintiffs do not permit punitive damages awards, does not
necessarily mean that the settlement is subsidizing those plaintiffs, if the state where the
manufacturer is headquartered, or the product was made, is favorable toward punitive
damages, and the courts in that state would apply its law on the issue in all cases brought
there. If class counsel are among those who often seek and obtain punitive damages, and
yet are willing to give them up for all or most of their clients, that might suggest that the
deal struck on punitive damages is not unreasonable.
For these reasons and perhaps others, there may be fewer real differences among class
members regarding punitive damages than would appear to be the case at first blush. On
the other hand, if there are real differences, and they are substantial, the courts should
carefully scrutinize any settlement in which some class members with genuine claims for
punitive damages give them up for the benefit of other members of the class.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
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whether, as a practical matter, the nonmonetary relief accorded in
the settlement provides all or substantially all of the class members
a realistic opportunity to obtain valuable relief.

This test would not rule out settlements such as the breastimplant and Georgine settlements, in which cash is available to class
members when and if they suffer compensable harms. 139 Similarly,
this test would be met in the heart-valve settlement, where all class
members are entitled to modest monetary relief on an equal basis, and
certain diagnostic and medical care are available to all class members
whenever certain medical conditions arise. 140 And, even in the airline
antitrust coupon case, where the court approved a coupon settlement
which allowed class members to apply coupons to future air transportation with any of the major domestic airlines, the court would not
have had to invalidate the settlement simply because the relief was
nonmonetary. In that case, the coupons were likely to be useful to all
class members, since to be a class member, one had to have flown
three times through certain "hub" airports utilized by the defendants.
Moreover, the redemption period was three to four years; the coupons
could be applied to tickets costing as little as $50; the coupons could
be used on discount flights; and the coupons could be handled by
travel agents, all factors indicating that there was no serious impediment to use of coupons by class members. It was thus clear that, over
the redemption period, virtually all the class members would have a
realistic opportunity to use at least some, if not all, of their coupons. 141
Neither the GM-truck settlement nor the Mustang-convertible
settlement, however, would survive this test because a significant
number of class members, indeed a majority of the class, would not be
willing or able to purchase the product over the relevant redemption
period, as the settling parties conceded in General Motors. On the
other hand, a settlement that provides a combination of coupons and
cash, or a coupon with some reasonable cash redemption value, might
pass muster. In short, our proposed Rule requires the court to apply
139 As noted earlier, even in those cases, the court must be vigilant in making sure that
the settlement does not redefine the notion of compensable harm to eliminate viable
claims of class members, as occurred for the pleural, loss-of-consortium, and many lungcancer claimants in Georgine. See supra Part II.B.1, II.B.3.
140 Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 149 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
141 But see In Camera, supra note 64, at 485-90 (surveying many coupon settlements and
maintaining that in-depth review of evidence in airline antitrust settlement demonstrated
that settling parties had vastly overestimated likely redemption rates); cf. Anthony Faiola,
In Settling with Airlines, There's No Free Ride-Coupons for Travelers, $16 Million for
Lawyers, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1995, at A10 (describing view, including that of federal judge
who approved settlement, that airline antitrust settlement provided large benefit to plaintiffs' lawyers and very little benefit to class ~embers).
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special scrutiny where the relief provided in the settlement is not the
type of valuable, fungible relief provided when Rule 23(b)(3) cases
are litigated to judgment.142
C. Attorneys' Fees
Before turning to the special problem of the attorneys' fees in
billion-dollar cases, with large amounts payable to individual claimants (like the silicone-gel breast-implant case), we have two preliminary suggestions. There is much current debate about whether the
lodestar or the percentage-of-the-fund approach, or some combination of the two, should be followed in damage class actions. In our
view, the outcome of that debate as applied to the typical class action
ought to have little or no bearing on resolving fees issues when there
are huge settlements. Because of the hundreds of thousands of dollars
at stake with every minute change in the percentage chosen, if a
percentage-of-recovery calculation is made, it is essential that it be
backed up by a lodestar determination to assure that class counsel's
fee is not excessive. For instance, if the percentage approach translated to a $500 per hour rate for attorney time (which could properly
be explained as a reasonable hourly rate, including a multiplier), such
a fee might be entirely appropriate. But if that same calculation translated to $1500 per hour, a reduction in the percentage would be
necessary.143
142 In a recently approved class settlement involving Mercedes-Benz cars alleged to
have steering-column vibration problems, class members are f}.venfreely transferable coupons, ranf}.ng in value from $2400 to $5700, to be used over a four-year redemption period
to reduce the purchase price of a new Mercedes or for use in making the down payment
Weiss v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1297, 1303 (D.NJ. 1995). The coupons may be used on top of any other Mercedes promotion, rebate, or incentive. Further,
Mercedes must use every certificate for the benefit of customers, if not for class members,
then for donation to charitable or educational institutions designated by plaintiffs' counsel,
thus f}.ving the defendant every incentive to encourage certificate use. And most significantly, after three years (i.e., one year before the coupon expires), every class member who
has yet to use the certificate has the unqualified right to exchange the certificate for onehalf of its face value in cash, simply by sending the certificate to the defendant with a
request to cash it in. Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement of Class
Action and Settlement Hearing 'f14(a) (face value of certificates), '1'1 15-16 (redemption
procedures), '117 (can be used over and above any promotion, rebate, etc.), '119 (redemption for cash), 'I 20 (free transferability), 'I 21 (use of all certificates for customers), Weiss
v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., No. 93-96 (D.NJ. filed Jan. 17, 1995).
143 A recent positive trend in the case law is to allow the district courts discretion, in
common-fund cases, to use either a lodestar or percentage-of-the-fund approach, and using
a lodestar as a cross-check or backup even where the court prefers the percentage method.
See, e.g., In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F3d 1291, 1295 (9th Cir.
1994) (district court did not abuse its discretion in using lodestar; fees awarded must be
reasonable under circumstances); Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, Inc., 9 F3d
513, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); In re Domestic Air, 148 F.R.D. 297, 357 (N.D. Ga.
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Second, we continue to be disturbed by class actions in which the
attorneys' fees are paid separately and directly by the defendant, instead of out of the class settlement fund. These cases are often advertised as being better for the class, since "all of the money goes to the
class, and the defendant, not the class, pays the attorneys' fees."1 44
Anyone familiar with the most rudimentary principles of economics
knows that that sounds better than it is because the money always
comes out of the class, whether directly or indirectly. In those cases
where the defendant makes the direct payment, it has made at least a
mental calculation of the total amount to be paid and then simply allocated a portion to the class and the rest to the plaintiff's attorneys'
fees.l 45 But because of the separateness of the payments, it is at least
arguable that the class members have no standing to object to the
amount of fees since, if the court decides that the defendant has to pay
less than the plaintiffs' lawyers seek, the defendant gets to keep the
difference rather than having it go to the class. Although we are not
convinced that standing is lacking, there is surely far less incentive for
absent class members to fight excessive counsel fees where the defendant, not the class, saves the money when an excessive request is
pared down. Similarly, the court has a reduced incentive to supervise
fees, since the money saved will not revert to the class.
For all these reasons, the class action Rules should treat direct
payments of fees from the defendant to the plaintiffs' lawyers as payments into the common fund. In addition, if the defendant does not
1973) (awarding fees according to percentage-of-the-fund approach while using lodestar
approach to verify reasonableness of award); General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, No. 940777, 1996 WL 51180, at *12 (Tex. Feb. 6, 1996) (finding that trial court, on remand, should
test $1500 hourly fee using lodestar approach).
144 As the Notice in the Bronco II case advertised: "This [fee] amount would be paid
solely by Ford and would not reduce, directly or indirectly, any of the Settlement's benefits
to Settlement Class members." Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement
and Hearing at 2, Bronco II, No. MDL-991 Section "G" (E.D. La.).
145 See Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422, 435-36 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
("Any settlement represents a total value figure that one party is willing to pay to end the
controversy. Attorneys' fees, even though they may not be technically deducted from tho
amount paid to the litigants, represent an integral part of the overall amount that the settling party is willing to pay, and as such, they have a direct effect on the net amount that
will ultimately be paid to the litigants."), writ granted, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 275 (1995), aff'd,
General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, No. 94-0777, 1996 WL 51180 (Tex. Feb. 9, 1996); In ro
General Motors Corp. Pick-Up 'fruck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 820 (3d
Cir.) (rejecting class counsel's position that objectors did not have standing to challenge fee
award on ground that defendant agreed to pay fee as "patently meritless," because tho
agreement "is, for practical purposes, a constructive common fund"), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 88 (1985); see also, e.g., Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 520 (1st
Cir. 1991) (stating that where there is no common fund and fees are to be paid pursuant to
"clear sailing" agreement district court should ordinarily exercise its equity jurisdiction and
entertain application).
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oppose a fee below a certain amount, any fee award "saved" by a
successful challenge to the award, or a sua sponte court reduction,
should go to the class and not the defendant.146 For example, assume
that, as in Bronco II, class counsel requested $4 million and the defendant did not oppose. If, as a result of class members' objections, the
court reduced the total award to $1 million, then that amount would
be paid by the defendant to class counsel, and $3 million would be
paid by the defendant into the class fund for the benefit of the class.
Similarly, if the defendant had argued in that situation that a proper
award was $2 million, and the court nevertheless agreed with the objectors that $1 million was more appropriate, only $2 million would be
paid to the class and the defendant would enjoy $1 million in
"savings."
Turning to the fee issues in the large, complex cases, one difficult
-problem relates to fees for those who opt out or who settle or obtain a
judgment after a case has been referred to the multidistrict panel, but
before a class settlement has been reached. It is obvious that, in the
silicone-gel breast-implant case, work of enormous value to all claimants was done by class counsel and the other members of the Steering
Committee who, among other things, created a depository for documents and depositions and prepared countless pleadings and legal
memoranda. The beneficiaries are not limited to members of the class,
but include those who settled or won a verdict along the way. as well
as those who chose to opt out of the settlement.
Under the MDL Rules, there appears to be some basis for making reasonable fee assessments against successful counsel in individual
cases that are resolved while the MDL case is pending, \vith payment
withheld by the defendant and made into the MDL coffers to be used
for the common good.14 7 However, that authority should be made
explicit in the statute or Rules.
The problem becomes somewhat more complicated after the individual claimants have opted out of a certified class. On the same theory that applies to pending cases, the federal courts arguably possess
the power to order attorneys who receive fees in federal cases to pay a
reasonable amount into the common fund, but the power is less clear
over plaintiffs who opt out and go into state court. In our view, since
the benefits enjoyed by opt-out plaintiffs are derived from the work of
the class counsel, the statute should make clear that those attorneys
146 This change would also resolve all doubts about the standing of class members to
object to class counsel's fee requests.
147 See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL-926 (N.D. Ala.
July 23, 1993) (order no. 13).
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(or their clients) may be assessed in some reasonable amount from the
recoveries in their individual cases under a common-benefit rationale.
The final fee problem in cases like the breast-implant case is how
to deal with fees for counsel who represent individual claimants. As
noted earlier, there are three categories of plaintiffs' lawyers: those
who did virtually no work on behalf of the class, those who did virtually no work on behalf of individuals but did substantial work on behalf of the class, and those who did substantial amounts of both
individual and class work. To make matters more complicated, there
are variations within each group based upon such factors as the
number of clients that an individual may have had (some lawyers had
fewer than a dozen, while other firms had several thousand); the time
at which the clients were signed up in relation to the degree of certainty of settlement; and whether some of their clients who were
within the class had no monetary recovery or recovered only relatively
modest amounts, such as for the costs of medical monitoring or implant explantation. The problem is further complicated by the fact
that, for counsel for future claimants, to the extent that fees are based
on the amounts of the recovery, it may be years, if ever, before they
earn any fees at all.t48
As noted earlier, in the breast-implant case, Judge Pointer dealt
with this issue in three ways. 149 First, he exercised the power, properly
in our view, to supervise the fees for individual attorneys who represent members of the clas_s and who are seeking fees for that work,
rather than for common benefit work, even if they are seeking fees
from the amount allocated to the client under the grid. The court in
Georgine, on the other hand, did not, but should have, exercised authority over the fees in individual cases. SecoJ:ld, Judge Pointer set
aside approximately twenty-four percent of the entire fund to be used
for both claims administration and attorneys' fees.
Finally, he appointed an Advisory Committee to set up a plan
and obtain information from attorneys with respect to fees. Assuming
that the plan is set up so that there are reasonable attomeys'-fees
guidelines, the problem is that the judge cannot possibly decide all of
the attorneys'-fees matters even at this stage, leaving aside the obvious fact that he will not be sitting for the entire thirty-plus years of the
settlement. The number of fee requests will be staggering and,
equally important, unless the court acts to appoint someone, there will
148 Another complication is the issue of expenses, particularly, what can be charged indl·
vidual clients out of their recovery, what can be charged to the common fund, and what the
lawyer must absorb.
149 See supra Part II.B.2.
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be nobody to present the other side when shady fee practices arise or
excessive requests are made.
Thus, for lawyers seeking fees for work on individual claims, a
mechanism needs to be devised to assure both the availability of an
adjudicator, other than the class action judge, and a court-appointed
institutional adversary who will oppose fee requests when necessary,
with the savings reverting back to the class as a whole. To relieve the
court of this ongoing burden, the court should have the power to appoint a special master to decide individual attorneys' fee claims, with
review by the court on an abuse-of-discretion basis only. This person
would review time and expense records and other relevant materials
and arguments made by counsel concerning their fee requests. Forms
should be developed to streamline the process, which would call for
all pertinent information relating to fee requests.
To assist the special master, the court should also appoint a fund
trustee who would, on an ongoing basis, review, comment on, and oppose individual fee requests, much the way the United States Trustees
act pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330, to protect the interests of creditors
and others in bankruptcies by their obligation to guard against excessive fees by persons performing services for the bankrupt party. This
person's sole duty in the class action would be to protect the common
fund for the benefit of claimants. The individual would not be bound
to oppose all fee requests, but would review them and oppose those
deemed excessive or improperly supported and thus a threat to the
common fund.
With respect to fees sought by the Plaintiffs' Negotiating Committee and others on the Steering Committee for the creation and
maintenance of the settlement fund, the court should also appoint
counsel to represent the unrepresented. This person would not have
an ongoing role as would the court-designated trustee on individual
fee claims, but would nevertheless play an important function in seeing that class counsel's fees do not get out of hand.
CONCLUSION

Class actions are important devices for assuring compensation for
victims of widespread wrongdoing and for deterring such conduct in
the future. The new breed of class action-dealing with productliability claims, and future as well as present claimants-raises a host
of new problems in protecting the unrepresented class members. We
believe that the suggestions made in this Article will improve the process and help assure that mass justice does not unjustly submerge the
interests of some, for the benefit of others, without legitimate reasons
for doing so.
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APPENDIX A

The Use of Rule 23(b)(l) Class Actions Brought Principally
To Resolve Damage Claims
As noted in the body of this Article, a relatively recent phenomenon that requires attention is the attempt by settling parties to use
Rule 23(b)(l)-which does not provide class members the opportunity to opt out-to resolve mass-tort class actions. This attempt is
made even though the complaint asserts claims principally or exclusively for money damages of the kind thought to come under Rule
23(b)(3) (if they are eligible for class treatment at all), which requires
that class members be given the opportunity to opt out.1so
In In reA. H. Robins Co. ,151 the district court certified for settlement purposes a class that had asserted claims against Aetna, the insurer of the tortfeasor, A.H. Robins, in part on the ground that Aetna
was directly liable to the class as a co-conspirator with Robins in its
campaign to hide the dangers of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device
from the class. Although Aetna did not, and could not, claim that it
was a limited fund (i.e., that the claims against it, if realized, were
greater than its assets), the district court certified the class under Rule
23(b)(1), without deciding whether the certification was under subdivision (A) or (B) of that Rule and, indeed, with little analysis of any
kind.152
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the class certification, specifically relying on Rule 23(b)(l)(A),153 which provides that class actions may be
maintained where, in addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule
23(a),
the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of ... inconsistent or varying
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.154

To be sure, read literally, certification might be proper in virtually
any case to avoid "inconsistent or varying adjudications." However,
we doubt that awards of damages in differing amounts in different jurisdictions "establish incompatible standards of conduct" in the sense
meant by the Rule's drafters. After all, the drafters took pains to note
150 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (requiring notice and opportunity to opt out in cases
certified under subsection (b)(3)).
151 No. 85-01307-R (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 1988) (order granting class certification), afrd,
880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 747.
154 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
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their doubt that even Rule 23(b)(3)-which requires individual notice
and opt-out rights-would permit class treatment for "mass disasters";155 it is very unlikely that they would, at the same time, have
allowed subsection (b)(3) to be swallowed up, and its protections
eliminated, by subsection (b)(l)(A), at least in th·e settlement context.156 On this score, the Rules Committee may want to revisit Rule
23(b)(l)(A) to reaffirm its narrow application to the types of litigation
referred to in the 1966 Advisory Committee Notes (e.g., to preempt
judgments in numerous actions to abate the same nuisance).t57 Other
than this modest suggestion, we do not consider this Rule elsewhere in
this Article.
In a few instances, class action settlements have sought to take
advantage of Rule 23(b)(l)(B), which applies where
the prosecution of separate actions ... would create a risk of ...
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.ISS
The threshold question is whether this part of the Rule could ever
apply where the defendant maintains that its liabilities, including its
contingent liabilities from a mass tort, are greater than its assets. The
contrary position is that the Rule was intended to apply to situations
where the object of the litigation-a trust fund, insurance contract, or
some other res-was the limited fund, and the only resort for a defendant whose coffers might not suffice to meet the demands of numerous individual tort claims is the shelter provided by the bankruptcy
laws or perhaps the federal interpleader act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335.
Even more problematic is the issue raised by the pending asbestos Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action, Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp.,1S9 a
mass-tort action, like Georgine,160 in which the settlement was agreed
to and then filed in federal court. In Ahearn, the settling parties made
two distinct but related arguments. Flrst, they argued that the settlement proceeds themselves could constitute a limited fund under Rule
155 Fed. R Civ. P. Rule 23 advisory committee's note, 39 F.RD. 69, 102-03 (1966).
156 See, e.g., In re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987)
(expansive view of Rule 23(b)(1) improper encroachment on Rule 23(b)(3)); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 523 F.2d 1083, 10&6
(9th Cir. 1975) (same).
1S7 Fed. R Civ. P. Rule 23 advisory committee's note, 39 F.RD. at 100.
158 Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
159 162 F.RD. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-40635 (5th Cir. Aug. 17,
1995).
160 157 F.RD. 246 (ED. Pa. 1994), vacated and remanded, Nos. 94-1925 et al., 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11191 (3d Cir. May 10, 1996).
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23(b)(l)(B). Second, they maintained that, absent (b)(l)(B) certification, "the prosecution of separate actions" by individual class members against the defendant would "impair" the other class members'
"ability to protect their interests" against the defendant, whose assets
were concededly insufficient to pay all claims made by future asbestos
claimants. In the settlement, the defendant put up less than five percent of its net worth, but the settling parties deemed this sufficient
because of a parallel settlement between the defendant and its insurers that freed nearly $1.5 billion for future asbestos plaintiffs. The
district court in Ahearn approved the settlement, noting that the terms
of Rule 23(b)(l)(B) do not require a "limited fund," and basically
adopting the settling parties' second argument that, without the settlement, the class members' interests in obtaining future compensation
would be impaired.
In our view, the settlement itself cannot constitute a limited fund
under Rule 23(b)(l)(B), lest any settlement be sufficient to invoke
subsection (b)(l)(B) and override the other parts of the Rule. Nor do
we believe that a defendant can invoke Rule 23(b)(l)(B) in the masstort context unless, at the very least, it is willing to put up a very considerable percentage, if not substantially all, of its assets (i.e., some
sort of alternative to bankruptcy). Further, serious constitutional
problems are posed by using Rule 23(b)(l)(B) as an end-run around
the opt-out provisions of the Rule.t6t Although we do not treat this
problem further in this Article, the Rules Committee should revisit
Rule 23(b)(l)(B) to clarify its scope.

161 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810-13 & n.3 (1985) (due process
requires that absent class members be given notice and opportunity to opt out, at least In
class actions seeking to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately
for money damages).
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B

The Amount-in-Controversy and Case-or-Controversy
Requirements

The complaint in Georgine asserted that the uninjured class members wanted medical monitoring, plus payments for emotional distress
and for the risk that they might become ill in the future. However, as
the settling parties conceded, the future class members did not actually want such relief, and the settlement provided no such relief but
rather provided an alternative dispute resolution system for future asbestos personal injury claims. This discordance between the complaint and the settlement agreement raises two related problems.
First, the complaint asserted only state-law causes of action and
invoked jurisdiction solely on the basis of diversity. However, it is
difficult to maintain that each class representative and each absent
class member pled. in good faith, claims for more than $50,000 in controversy as required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
when, in fact, the plaintiffs sought no current monetary relief at all. 162
In our view, assuming that some uses of diversity jurisdiction are
worth retaining, this problem should be resolved through an amendment to the diversity statute that would permit, in certain types of
cases involving large numbers of plaintiffs asserting the same general
injury, aggregation of claims to meet a particular threshold. For example, the statute might overrule Zahn for all cases in which at least
500 persons, including absent class members, assert good-faith claims
of at least $10 million in total recovery (average claim, $20,000).
Under this formulation, Georgine might well survive an amount-incontroversy challenge (quite apart from other legal obstacles to its
162 See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973} (in class action based
on diversity jurisdiction, in which certification is sought under Rule 23(b}(3), each named
plaintiff and each absent class member must have more than $50,000 in controversy); St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938} (to dismiss for
failure to have requisite amount in controversy, it must appear to be "legal certainty" that
good-faith claims are for less than jurisdictional amount).
The Fifth Circuit has held that Zahn was overruled by the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994), which the court found to aUow supplemental
jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiffs who do not meet the $50,000 jurisdictional minimum.
In re Abbott Lab., 51 F3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995). We believe this decision is wrong in light of
Congress' clearly expressed intent to the contrary, see H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875. Although the great majority of
courts that have addressed this question have adopted this view, see Abbott lAb., 51 F3d
at 528 n.8 (listing cases), the Seventh Circuit has recently adopted the Fifth Circuit's position, albeit not in a class action. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc.,
No. 95-2760, 1996 WL 70273 (7th Cir. Feb. 20, 1996). Regardless of its merits, the Abbott
Laboratories holding is inapposite in a case like Georgine where not even a single named
plaintiff's claims met the amount-in-controversy requirement
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survival), since some relatively small number of "nonfutures" class
members suffered from compensable illnesses at the time the complaint was filed. We see no policy justification for allowing thousands
of individual $75,000 tort suits in the federal courts, while disallowing
a class action that could resolve the same number of similar suits each
worth $40,000. Nevertheless, under the current regime, the failure of
the plaintiffs in Georgine to have a good-faith intention to seek any
present recovery raises a serious and, in our view, fatal amount-incontroversy problem.t63
A second, more difficult problem is the general question whether
a case brought to resolve future "injuries," with no serious intention
of litigating the claims asserted in the complaint, and no nexus between those claims and the future relief that might be afforded class
members if they fall ill, is a justiciable "case" or "controversy" under
Article III. 164 This problem might be overcome if, in fact, the class
was afforded substantial present-day relief of the type sought in the
complaint, assuming that such relief could plausibly be awarded under
current law. In this manner, the court would be assured that the complaint was not merely a subterfuge for the imposition by court order
of a private agreement where nothing was presently in dispute.t6s
This problem is more difficult than the § 1332 problem, not only
because it cannot be fixed by Congress, but also because it underscores why "futures" class actions have a tendency to be unfair to the
future-class members. Those class members, as explained in more detail in the body of the Article, may not know that they are members of
163 We acknowledge that, in other mass-tort cases, the courts have rejected amount-Incontroversy challenges based on Zahn. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 72325 (4th Cir.) (declining to dismiss class action due to lack of "legal certainty" that plaintiffs
failed to meet jurisdictional amount), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); Payton v. Abbott
Lab., 83 F.R.D. 382,395 (D. Mass. 1979) (same), vacated on other grounds, tOO F.R.D 336
(D. Mass. 1983). While we doubt that those decisions are true to Zahn-to which there
appears to be considerable, and perhaps understandable, hostility-Georglne presents a
different situation than those cases for two related reasons. First, there is no relationship
between what the future plaintiffs requested in their complaint (e.g., medical monitoring
and fear-based damages) and what they got (an alternative dispute resolution system to
adjudicate unripe injury claims), thus drawing into serious question the good-faith nature
of the allegations of the complaint. Second, as a factual matter, all the named "futures"
plaintiffs who testified at deposition or trial specifically disavowed that they had any Intention to seek damages at the time the complaint was filed, which also suggested that their
claims of more than $50,000 in controversy were not genuine at the time they were made.
164 U.S. Const. art. III. § 2; cf. National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch.,
660 F.2d 9, 17-18 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1981) (class action settlement may not release claims not
asserted in complaint unless both claims in complaint and unpleaded claims are based on
same facts).
165 See Keene Corp. v. Fiorelli, 14 F.3d 726,730-33 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing Article III
"case and controversy" requirement as necessitating adjudication of litigants' legal rights in
actual controversy).
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the class, cannot know whether they will become injured in the future,
and thus can have no idea what their circumstances will be if they do
become injured, all factors making it more llkely that they will be
shortchanged by the settlement terms and less likely that their opt-out
rights will be meaningful. These indicia of unfairness that exist when
the courts require class members to take action of one kind or another
regarding their unripe claims, also run counter, not coincidentally in
our view, to the constitutional policy against the adjudication of
"'conjectural' or 'hypothetical"' cases.t66

166 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (discussing constitutional component of
standing doctrine as requiring "distinct and palpable" inquiry (quoting Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S 95, 101-02 (1983))).

